When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was published in 2000, it was the first time that an international human rights instrument had recognised the freedom to conduct a business. To understand how conducting a business came to occupy the status of a fundamental right, I undertake an examination of the drafting process of Article 16 in Section 2. Early drafts protected the freedom to pursue an occupation, before the freedom to conduct a business eventually became a freestanding entitlement. This was thanks to the influence of Convention members associated with the European People’s Party who were instrumental in ensuring Article 16 was added to the draft Charter. In Section 3, I critically assess the claim contained in the Explanations to the Charter that Article 16 was simply a codification of pre-existing entitlements deriving from the case law of the Court of Justice. In Section 4, I examine the impact of Article 16 Many of the limitations that constrain the scope of Article 16 have been weakened, or have not proved to be the limitations that were originally envisaged. The Court of Justice’s defence of select areas, such as consumer protection, has shielded the deregulatory potential of Article 16 from view. Yet Article 16 has had a real and damaging impact on workers’ rights across the Union. Protecting the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 means that a remarkably broad range of actions taken in the course of running a business are now accepted as the exercise of a fundamental right.

The Common European Asylum System constitutes one of the principal areas in which the fundamental rights of individuals are essentially placed in competition with the core principle of mutual confidence and the need to preserve the effectiveness of EU law. That competitive relationship becomes particularly evident when applicants for international protection rely on alleged violations of their fundamental rights in order to contest their transfer to the Member State that is normally responsible for examining their asylum request according to the criteria of the Dublin III Regulation. The balancing process that needs to be carried out in this respect and the measure of the monitoring obligation that EU law imposes on the receiving Member State regarding the protection of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers are well exemplified by the preliminary ruling in Jawo. That case provides additional clarification regarding the circumstances in which the protection of fundamental rights may introduce exceptions to the principle of mutual trust. At the same time, it illustrates the inherent tensions that exist between the protection of fundamental rights and the application of the principle of mutual confidence.

The Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become secondary concerns. The decision doubtless involves some self-aggrandizement by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which asserts for itself a new role in protecting European fundamental rights, but it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes sense in the context of the European and German law. I argue that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves.

The concept of the essence of a fundamental right—set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)—operates as a constant reminder that our core values as Europeans are absolute. In other words, they are not up for balancing. As the seminal judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Schrems shows, where a measure imposes a limitation on the exercise of a fundamental right that is so intense and so comprehensive that it calls into question that right as such, that measure is incompatible with the Charter, as it deprives the right at issue of its essence. This is so without the need for a balancing exercise of competing interests, because a measure that compromises the very essence of a fundamental right is automatically disproportionate. Therefore, the present contribution supports the contention that in order for the concept of essence to function in a constitutionally meaningful way, both EU and national courts should apply the “respect-for-the-essence test” before undertaking a proportionality assessment.

In recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.