This chapter offers an example of the role of the Bank in European state finance. The kingdom of Prussia made heavy use of the Bank during the Seven Years War (1756—1763). Public finance in Prussia during this period was primitive, lacking basic features such as a bond market or central bank. Under heavy financial pressure, Prussian King Frederick II chose to finance much of the war through the production of debased coinage. The task of minting debased coins was outsourced to private contractors (“mint entrepreneurs”), who purchased much of the necessary silver in Amsterdam, making use of credit which was abundant in the Amsterdam market. Details of these transactions are revealed in the Bank’s ledgers. Frederick also relied on gold subsidies from Great Britain, which were paid via Amsterdam and can also be matched to Bank records. Finally, at the end of the war, Frederick called upon his entrepreneurs to engineer a reverse debasement (reinforcement). This activity once again relied heavily on Dutch resources, including remote smelting furnaces, Amsterdam credit, and Bank money. Traces of the entrepreneurs’ activity can again be seen in the Bank’s records.

Kant’s moral argument for faith in God aims not at converting unbelievers but at offering those who believe a reason for principled assent to the existence of God on moral grounds. It is based on a rational connection between purposive action and assent that applies not only to religious belief but to many other purposes as well, such as what Royce called “loyalty to a lost cause.” The argument in the Critique of Pure Reason differs significantly from its presentation in later works. Kantian moral faith is in tension with Cliffordian evidentialism but not inconsistent with it, and the two together constitute the doxastic virtue lying between the twin vices of uncritical credulity and stubborn incredulity; together they enable us to avoid the complacencies of both despairing resignation and overconfidence.

Kant is critical of many of the practices of Christianity in his time. But when we appreciate the dynamic relation between rational and revealed religion as Kant conceives them, the apparent opposition becomes more questionable and raises more questions than it answers. Kant’s project in the Religion bears important affinities with the religious philosophy of Moses Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn’s philosophy of church and state and their relation involve a number of radical proposals expressive of Enlightenment religious consciousness. Mendelssohn’s concept of enlightened Judaism bears interesting comparison to Kant’s enlightened reflections on Christianity. Mendelssohn defends a form of evidentialism even more radical that Clifford’s. He also defends a conception of the freedom of religious conscience that inspires Kant’s treatment of that topic in part four of the Religion. Conscience is an important theme in Kant’s moral philosophy, which has special application to religious conscience and the freedom of conscience Kant and Mendelssohn both defend.