Robinson’s unification algorithm can be identified as the underlying machinery of both C. Meredith’s rule D (condensed detachment) in propositional logic and of the construction of principal types in lambda calculus and combinatory logic. In combinatory logic, it also plays a crucial role in the construction of Meyer, Bunder & Powers’ Fool’s model. This paper now considers pattern matching, the unidirectional variant of unification, as a basis for logical inference, typing, and a very simple and natural model for untyped combinatory logic. An analysis of the new typing scheme will enable us to characterize a large class of terms of combinatory logic which do not change their principal type when being weakly reduced. We also consider the question whether the major or the minor premisse should be used as the fixed pattern.

We study combinatorial and order theoretic structures arising from the fragment of combinatory logic spanned by the basic combinator ${{\mathbf{M}}}$ . This basic combinator, named as the Mockingbird by Smullyan, is defined by the rewrite rule ${{\mathbf{M}}} \mathsf{x}_1 \to \mathsf{x}_1 \mathsf{x}_1$ . We prove that the reflexive and transitive closure of this rewrite relation is a partial order on terms on ${{\mathbf{M}}}$ and that all connected components of its rewrite graph are Hasse diagram of lattices. This last result is based on the introduction of new lattices on duplicative forests, which are sorts of treelike structures. These lattices are not graded, not self-dual, and not semi-distributive. We present some enumerative properties of these lattices like the enumeration of their elements, of the edges of their Hasse diagrams, and of their intervals. These results are derived from formal power series on terms and on duplicative forests endowed with particular operations.

Systems of illative logic are logical calculi formulated in the untyped λ-calculus supplemented with certain logical constants.1 In this short paper, I consider a paradox that arises in illative logic. I note two prima facie attractive ways of resolving the paradox. The first is well known to be consistent, and I briefly outline a now standard construction used by Scott and Aczel that establishes this. The second, however, has been thought to be inconsistent. I show that this isn’t so, by providing a nonempty class of models that establishes its consistency. I then provide an illative logic which is sound and complete for this class of models. I close by briefly noting some attractive features of the second resolution of this paradox.

Symmetic combinatory logic with the symmetric analogue of a combinatorially complete base (in the form of symmetric λ-calculus) is known to lack the Church-Rosser property. We prove a much stronger theorem that no symmetric combinatory logic that contains at least two proper symmetric combinatory has the Church-Rosser property. Although the statement of the result looks similar to an earlier one concerning dual combinatory logic, the proof is different because symmetric combinators may form redexes in both left and right associated terms. Perhaps surprisingly, we are also able to show that certain symmetric combinatory logics that include just one particular constant are not confluent. This result (beyond other differences) clearly sets apart symmetric combinatory logic from dual combinatory logic, since all dual combinatory systems with a single combinator or a single dual combinator are Church-Rosser. Lastly, we prove that a symmetric combinatory logic that contains the fixed point and the one-place identity combinator has the Church-Rosser property.

Evidence is given that implication (and its special case, negation) carry the logical strength of a system of formal logic. This is done by proving normalization and cut elimination for a system based on combinatory logic or λ-calculus with logical constants for and, or, all, and exists, but with none for either implication or negation. The proof is strictly finitary, showing that this system is very weak. The results can be extended to a “classical” version of the system. They can also be extended to a system with a restricted set of rules for implication: the result is a system of intuitionistic higher-order BCK logic with unrestricted comprehension and without restriction on the rules for disjunction elimination and existential elimination. The result does not extend to the classical version of the BCK logic.

Because the main difference between combinatory weak equality and λβ-equality is that the rule

is valid for the latter but not the former, it is easy to assume that another way of defining combinatory β-equality is to add rule (ξ) to the postulates for weak equality. However, to make this true, one must choose the definition of combinatory abstraction in (ξ) very carefully. If one tries to use one of the more common abstraction algorithms, the result will be an equality, =ξ, that is either equivalent to βη-equality (and so strictly stronger than β-equality) or else strictly weaker than β-equality. This paper will study the relations =ξ for several commonly used abstraction-algorithms, distinguish between them, and axiomatize them.