Regulators require lenders to display a subset of credit card features in summary tables before customers finalize a credit card choice. Some jurisdictions require some features to be displayed more prominently than others to help ensure that consumers are made aware of them. This approach could lead to untoward effects on choice, such that relevant but nonprominent product features do not factor in as significantly. To test this possibility, we instructed a random sample of 1615 adults to choose between two hypothetical credit cards whose features were shown side by side in tables. The sample was instructed to select the card that would result in the lowest financial charges, given a hypothetical scenario. Critically, we randomly varied whether the annual interest rates and fees were made visually salient by making one, both, or neither brighter than other features. The findings show that even among credit-savvy individuals, choice tends strongly toward the product that outperforms the other on a salient feature. As a result, we encourage regulators to consider not only whether a key feature should be made more salient, but also the guidelines regarding when a key feature should be displayed prominently during credit card acquisition.

This article studies the genesis and early international expansion of the bank-issued credit card—an American innovation that quickly took hold in western Europe. Empirical evidence undermines the proposition of a single firm building a proprietary network. In fact, it was a constellation of participants that combined three characteristics, namely, a critical mass of both retail customers and retail merchants; the capacity to implement new technological solutions; and the ability to forge resilient collaborations across national borders. The evidence supports the value of collaboration in retail financial services as means of appropriating network externalities. Moreover, other conceptual and empirical studies, especially those based on two-sided markets, neglect the greater implications that initial conditions in this industry have on long-term success.

While credit cards provide transactions services, as do currency and demand deposits, credit cards have never been included in measures of the money supply. The reason is accounting conventions, which do not permit adding liabilities, such as credit card balances, to assets, such as money. However, economic aggregation theory and index number theory measure service flows and are based on microeconomic theory, not accounting. Barnett et al. derived the aggregation and index number theory needed to measure the joint services of credit cards and money. They derived and applied the theory under the assumption of risk neutrality. But since credit card interest rates are high and volatile, risk aversion may not be negligible. We extend the theory by removing the assumption of risk neutrality to permit risk aversion in the decision of the representative consumer.

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIFs): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing, but it will however lead to higher cardholders’ fees and, most likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders’ fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the payment networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will lead to the unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be provided either by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences of the fact that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.