The chapter will cover one of the most critical and devastating issues in cyber abuse, namely cybercrime. The chapter will start by describing the different forms of cybercrime, such as cyber hacking, cyberattacks, phishing, insurance fraud, online consumer fraud, and more. The chapter will continue by presenting theories regarding the reasons behind the motivations that lead each Dark Tetrad personality to commit cybercrimes. The final section of the chapter will present findings about the relationship between each Dark Tetrad trait and the different forms of cybercrime.

The chapter examines the distinction between public and private cyberattacks and responses to them in domestic law (e.g. application of criminal law) and international law (e.g. self-defence and countermeasures). After describing the different purposes, nature, and effects of cyberattacks committed by public and private actors, it argues that the determination of whether a particular cyberattack is of a public or private nature should define how states respond to cybersecurity risks. It then argues that the existing domestic and international law frameworks regulating cyberattacks suffer from serious limitations and proposes a holistic approach for responding to cyberattacks, taking into account the difference between public and private cyberattacks.

This chapter examines how a cyberattack that has consequences similar to a kinetic or physical attack – causing serious loss of life or physical damage – could be encompassed within the crimes that may be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). While it is a very limited subset of cyber operations that might fall within the ambit of the ICC’s Rome Statute, the chapter explains when and how a cyberattack could constitute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or the crime of aggression. The chapter additionally acknowledges limitations as to which attacks would be encompassed, given, particularly, the ICC’s gravity threshold as well as the hurdle of proving attribution by admissible evidence that could meet the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding such limitations, increased awareness of the largely previously overlooked potential of the Rome Statute to cover certain cyberattacks could potentially contribute to deterring such crimes and to reaching the goal of a state of “cyber peace.”

Chapter 17 attempts to pin down a moving target, cyber and its use and utility in armed conflict. The cyber targets chosen by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are detailed. The chapter defines cyber “attacks,” differentiating them from cyber “operations” – akin to a felony-misdemeanor distinction. Cyberattacks are found to be a use of armed force, in the sense of UN Charter Article 2(4), raising the right of victim states to respond with armed force in self-defense. Potential cyber conflicts are classified as international or non-international based upon their perpetrators. The difficulties of attribution of cyberattacks are detailed, including sovereignty and military necessity. A counter to cyberattack is belligerent reprisal, which is explored. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) are a major problem. After defining CNI, the US position on responses is discussed. Recent changes in US cyber policy authorize far greater cyber retaliation and reprisal, as well as providing federal funding to carry them out. Finally, CNI’s weak link, the unwillingness of civilian corporations to fund their own cyber protection, is noted.

This chapter takes a step closer to legal writing on Article 2(4) and cyberattacks, and considers the use of consensus claims: specifically, claims that there is 'general acceptance' of, 'unanimity' on, or 'a majority view' with regard to the meaning of the prohibition as armed force. It asks what is invoked when these kinds of claims are made, and seeks to account for what consensus claims signify in legal writing. The chapter then proceeds by looking at the footnotes following these claims. The ‘sources’ these footnotes list seemingly function to substantiate the consensus claim. However, as shown in the chapter appendix, in order to support their consensus claims scholars largely refer to the same publicists. Using the notion of “concept symbols” as coined by Henry Small, the chapter seeks to account for the function of these references to the most-cited scholars, and how they turn into the bearers of majority opinion. The chapter concludes that even though one single reference can appear to be quite innocuous, when considered as a more widespread practice it seriously impacts who gets a say – and thus, ultimately, what we know – in international law.

This chapter asks how scholars reconstruct the meaning of the prohibition on the use of force in light of the “novel features” (Benatar) of cyberwar. Given the range of effects cyberattacks can have the question is where scholars draw the boundary of force. By creating a dialogue between different pieces and juxtaposing the arguments scholars make, this chapter shows what legal knowledge construction at the boundaries of Article 2(4) looks like. Specifically, it identifies two argumentative turns scholars take. The first pertains explicitly to the boundaries of the norm, and the chapter shows the subsequent trajectory of an argument about the (in)sufficiency of Article 2(4) in regulating these kinds of cyberattacks. The second turn pertains to the classification of the threat. Whereas to some scholars cyberattacks simply constitute a new means to wage war, to others the change is much more fundamental. Whether a scholar opts for the first label or the second, matters to how the legal analysis proceeds towards, again, a diagnosis about the (in)sufficiency of the norm. In sum, this chapter shows how exactly legal writing constructs legal knowledge in relation to Article 2(4).

In this chapter, we introduce a Software-Defined Active Synchronous Detection (SDASD) approach to defending against both the cyberattacks on SDN network and power bot attack on inverters. First, an effective defense strategy is devised and implemented in the SDN network controller to identify and mitigate cyberattacks on the SDN network of networked microgrids. Second, with a secured SDN network, an active synchronous detection method is devised to accurately detect and localize power bot attacks on networked microgrids by sending a probe signal to inverter controllers in networked microgrids and checking the responses.