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Angola, MPLA, UNITA, Angolan Civil War, De Beers, Lev Leviev This chapter presents a case study of Angola. Of all the states examined in this research, the Angola case best illustrates how state responses to the Kimberley Process can be a result of completion for market share. Angola was an initial member of the Kimberley Process in 2003 but was mostly indifferent to the agreement until De Beers reentered the country in 2005 after the resolution of a court case. The main competitor of De Beers in Angola, Lev Leviev had a monopoly over the legal trade until De Beers returned. This company is known for ignoring the Kimberley Process. Since De Beers has gained in market share continuously since 2005, the Angolan state has become more responsive to the Kimberley Process and served as president in 2016. Other challenges that Angola has faced in relation to Kimberley Process compliance are examined, such as porous borders and unclear regulatory policies.
The Kimberley Process is a weak international agreement, so why have states expended scarce resources to stay in compliance? This is the puzzle that will be laid out in the introductory chapter of this book, along with a discussion about the history and nature of the international agreement. The chapter discusses the importance of the diamond trade to the development of many states in Africa. While De Beers has long dominated the global diamond trade, the Kimberley Process was implemented in the early 2000s when the firm was starting to lose market share. Thus, other actors in the global diamond trade are examined, specifically Lev Leviev, who has made inroads into the diamond sector in many of the states examined in this study. The chapter also studies the diamond trade in Africa as a mode of exchange and questions whether the Kimberley Process has influenced this. .
This chapter examines Namibia, the state with the highest level of compliance in the study. Also, this case is the clearest example of compliance with the Kimberley Process being a reflection of diamond dependence, specifically the Namibian government’s longstanding dependence on De Beers. Other companies have tried to enter the Namibian market, but the Kimberley Process has played an essential role in creating a regulatory environment within Namibia that is advantageous to De Beers. The relationship between De Beers and SWAPO largely explains why the state has mainly complied and cooperated with the Kimberley Process since it was implemented, whereas other comparable alluvial diamond producers in sub-Saharan Africa have had difficulty complying.
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