History typically portrays the Revolution as an American war for independence in which the colonists severed their ties with the mother country across the Atlantic and incidentally fought off Indian raids on the western frontier. Native Americans did little to affect the outcome of the Revolution so they are usually accorded a minimal role in its story. This chapter, in contrast, recognizes that Native peoples, and their lands, played a significant role in the causes and course of the Revolution and demonstrates that the Revolution mattered profoundly and had huge repercussions in Indian country. Rather than simply fulfilling the negative role prescribed for them in the Declaration of Independence, Native Americans waged their own wars of independence and fought to defend their lands, lives, and freedom.

The ongoing convergence of the various corporate governance systems in the world is reflected by the increasingly important institute of the independent director. Even legal systems, like Germany, which require a dualistic board structure and thus have no or less need for independent directors have introduced independent directors. The paper examines the approach taken in Delaware and Germany and compares them. The comparison shows that while the concept of the independent director is the same in both jurisdictions, it has been implemented rather differently. The legal comparison may, thus, provide suggestions for improving the determination of independence of directors.

This chapter argues that corporate law is unique in a way that is not widely recognized, and is not unique in the way it is widely thought to be. First, unlike other fields of law where fiduciary obligations play a key role, in corporate law, not one, not two, but three distinct actors owe fiduciary duties—executive officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. The beneficiaries of those actors' duties, the reasons for imposing duties, and the scope and demands of fiduciary duties differ for the three actors. Thus, there is not a singular duty of care and loyalty in Delaware corporate law, but multiple variations of those duties owed by multiple actors. Delaware has a law of fiduciaries, not a fiduciary law. Second, this chapter challenges the supposed standard of conduct-standard of review divergence first hailed in 1993 by Professor Melvin Eisenberg as unique to corporate law.The construct was descriptively inaccuratewhen Professor Eisenberg first wrote, it has been little used by the Supreme Court since then, and the standards often converge rather than diverge.