This chapter is focused on aspects ot the superordinate Idea of the Good. Why is the first principle of all a normative principle (Section 2.1)? How does the Idea of the Good differ from an “ordinary” Form of the Good (Section 2.2)? Why is the unhypothetical first principle of all also the goal of everything, that which all desire (Section 2.3)? How does the Idea of the Good differ from the Demiurge? Why is the Demiurge good but not the Good (Section 2.4)? How is the admonition in Theaetetus to “assimilate to god” related to the Good as goal (Section 2.5)? In Symposium, the relation between eros and the Good is explored (Section 2.6). In Lysis, the idea of a “prōton philon” is comapred to the Idea of the Good as goal (Section 2.7). The evidence frrom Aristotle and from the indirect tradition that Plato identified the Good with “the One” is assembled. Why is oneness an index of goodness? The idea of integrated unity according to kind is introduced (Section 2.8).

Plutarch the philosopher is present in all his texts. His allegiance is not in doubt: he is a follower of Plato, who is open-minded to other schools, as far as their views are reconcilable with Plato’s. He is above all committed to the dialogical spirit pervading Plato’s works. In several more technical treatises, he develops the core of his philosophical views. These have to do with the composition of the world-soul and its image, the human soul. From there, Plutarch develops his views on moral psychology: it is the task of reason, the divine presence in us, to control the irrational passions. This idea forms the basis of various texts in which the therapy of the soul and the development of character are the central goals. Plutarch’s concept of philosophy and his doctrinal stance are quite different from what we find in later Platonism. Later doxographical reports on Plutarch are not always reliable.

This chapter highlights the close interconnection between cosmology and human nature in the Timaeus. According to Timaeus, human beings are not merely part of the cosmos; they play a crucial role in explaining how the cosmos came to be. The cosmos must contain three kinds of mortal beings in order to be complete, and all three derive from human beings, as a result of varying degrees of moral and cognitive failure. Recognizing the distinctive role human beings play in completing the cosmos complicates the standard picture of Timaeus’ cosmology, as well as his account of human nature. While in large part the cosmos is a product of divine craft, in some part it is the product of the inevitable disturbance of immortal souls due to mortal embodiment. Human beings have a special status as the first generation of mortal beings, as well as the only ones produced solely by divine craft. However, this distinction does not extend beyond the first generation, nor does it include any women. Ultimately, Timaeus’ account of human nature blurs the lines between humans and gods, as well as between humans and non-human animals.

Celsus is important evidence for Middle Platonist thought over the nature of the demiurge. This paper argues that he identified the demiurge with an impersonal first principle, the form of the good. In showing how the evidence for Celsus helps to explain the metaphysics at work in this model, it aims to remove doubt that it is a model widely shared by other Platonists.

Celsus is important evidence for Middle Platonist thought over the nature of the demiurge. This paper argues that he identified the demiurge with an impersonal first principle, the form of the good. In showing how the evidence for Celsus helps to explain the metaphysics at work in this model, it aims to remove doubt that it is a model widely shared by other Platonists.

This chapter sets out to explore the thesis that Plato, at least in his later years, in his efforts to identify the nature of his First Principle, was inclined to settle on the concept of a rational World Soul, with demiurgic functions, and that this was a doctrine that his faithful amanuensis in his last years, Philip of Opus, advanced on his own account, in the belief that in this he was developing the latest theories of his Master.

Emphasis on the ‘craftsmanlike’ character of creation in the Timaeus can give the impression that the cosmos is no more an ‘animal’ than Dr Frankenstein’s monster. But Middle Platonists took more seriously the biological implications of the claim that the god is the world’s father as well as its maker, implanting a soul in matter which (as in all animals) brings the cosmos to maturity through its own creative agency. Entailments of the view are that the world soul is first and foremost the ‘nutritive’ soul of the cosmos and that the soul must be a structural feature of the cosmic body rather than a distinct substance.

By exploring three issues which connect music with Platonic cosmology, I argue that, according to Plutarch, this connection was at the same time very important and severely limited. (1) In several passages of De animae procreatione, Plutarch compares the demiurge to a musician. These comparisons suggest a certain degree of similarity, but also a significant degree of difference between the two and, accordingly, between cosmic harmony and music. (2) Similarly, Plutarch’s reception of the notion of ‘music of the spheres’, as it emerges from a discussion in Quaestiones convivales, confirms the connection between music and the cosmos only to a limited extent. What the answers of the discussion have in common is that they all warn against excessive appreciation of music. (3) Finally, in Amatorius and De Pythiae oraculis, Plutarch distances musical experience from divine inspiration (enthousiasmos). In general, this persistent combination of importance and limitedness can be explained by Plutarch’s interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus.

This chapter examines the different levels of divine agency Calcidius posits, in a fluid structure of three gods; it assesses the potential influence of Numenius and Stoicism on this aspect of the commentary.

Cormac McCarthy scholars have long noted the Gnostic themes evident in the author’s work. Like many of his literary influences, McCarthy’s novels focus on the problems of suffering, violence, and evil, but McCarthy displays a unique tendency to examine these matters in the context of the Gnostic worldview, examining the nature of the divine soul in the material world, humanity’s tenuous place within the indifferent cosmos, and questions regarding religious authority, all fundamental both to the Gnostic religious experience and to understanding McCarthy’s literary oeuvre. While critics have most often focused on Outer Dark, Suttree, and Blood Meridian in their analysis of McCarthy’s Gnostic themes and imagery, McCarthy’s general focus on problematic human authorities, and the problematic nature of authority in all human affairs, especially law and religion, appears in practically all of McCarthy’s novels, beginning with The Orchard Keeper. McCarthy’s portrayals of authority demonstrate his knowledge of original Gnostic texts and the influential scholarly works that first explained these texts to the wider world after the discovery of the Nag Hammadi library.