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The book concludes by drawing out the implications of the overarching theory and findings for the future of democracy. The chapter argues that laissez-faire extremism and genuine democracy cannot coexist indefinitely. The lack of security and stability of the former will continually generate cultural and democratic discontent, intensifying social conflict and creating ideal conditions for charismatic leaders to emerge. We discuss various alternatives to neoliberalism, including the internationalization of tax and social welfare policy and economic democratization. This leads to our second argument: that democracy can best save itself by making itself worth saving. Democracies should answer the challenges of populism and other forms of discontent by ignoring calls for greater democratic elitism (which would only validate discontented narratives). Instead, democratic institutions and actors, especially political parties, should reform and recommit themselves to their role as channels for citizens’ voices.
‘In the first place it is instructive to ask how a poet could meet the challenge of representing the population of a city on stage; in the second, this exercise is likely to shed light on the political function of Greek tragedy. More specifically it will shed light on the relationship between tragedy and democracy ? a vexed question in recent years ? for no consideration of democracy in drama can neglect the role of democracy’s central player.’ The issue of having a fully–fledged democratic system in Hong Kong goes close to the heart of the whole Hong Kong issue today.
Clearly the PRC would be – and was – against any significant moves by the UK in the meantime. Unlike the usual colonial template for the emergence of independent entities, whereby self–government was introduced on the way to formal independence, Hong Kong was no Malaya or Nigeria. By the terms of the Declaration itself, even from the UK’s perspective, what was involved was the ‘restoration’ to China of Hong Kong, which now was to be accompanied by nothing far short of a calculated provocation. The Joint Declaration had not provided, or promised, democratic reform. It was to be promised subsequently in China’s Basic Law for post–handover Hong Kong. Equally the Joint Declaration did not prevent explicitly the UK from commencing democratic reforms once Hong Kong was lost to it. That was the door wherein Britain went.
America's original Progressives, rising to prominence at the turn of the twentieth century, sounded the theme of democratic reform. The Progressive push for democratization is complicated by the fact that the Movement was also the launching point for the modern administrative state. For Theodore Roosevelt, the Constitution's Federalist Framers had obsessed about majority tyranny and thus erected a system which enshrined minority tyranny. Like Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson believed that the American system of government was too undemocratic and, also like Roosevelt, he pinned blame on the Framers' obsession with a highly individualized and abstract notion of liberty. In thinking about administration in this way, as a means of reconciling democratization with expert governance, Wilson thought in terms that have proved to be more relevant to contemporary American government than Roosevelt did. Popular presidential leadership, championed by both Wilson and Roosevelt, has proved to be a central feature of American politics.
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