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2 results

  • Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude

  • D. Justin Coates
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 49 / Issue 2 / March 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 208-229

  • Following P. F. Strawson, a number of philosophers have argued that if hard incompatibilism is true, then its truth would undermine the justification or value of our relationships with other persons. In this paper, I offer a novel defense of this claim. In particular, I argue that if hard incompatibilism is true, we cannot make sense of: the possibility of promissory obligation, the significance of consent, or the pro tanto wrongness of paternalistic intervention. Because these practices and normative commitments are central to our relationships as we currently conceive of them, it follows that hard incompatibilism has radically revisionary conclusions.

  • Chapter 3 - Divine Determinism and Free Will

  • Peter Furlong
  • Book:
    The Challenges of Divine Determinism
    Published online:
    07 June 2019
    Print publication:
    06 June 2019, pp 60-85

  • Summary

    In this chapter I continue the task, begun in the last chapter, of considering whether divine determinism undermines human free will. In this chapter I take up manipulation arguments. I begin by focusing on Derk Pereboom’s Four Case Argument. This argument moves from intuitions about cases in which humans are manipulated by other humans to cases in which they are determined by laws of nature, maintaining that the original intuition that the human agent was not morally responsible is preserved even when the case is modified in various ways. I propose a variant of this argument in which the final case involves divine determinism. I also consider an argument that makes a direct appeal to intuition, maintaining that it is obvious that the sort of manipulation involved in divine determinism undermines human moral responsibility. I consider replies to both arguments, noting especially replies that depend upon pointing to the radical differences between God and human manipulators. I close with an investigation of bullet biting in the context of rejecting the truth of common intuitions.