This article presents a theoretical framework by which to understand how disasters are reconciled with a state’s existing obligations under international law. This ‘reactive’ model of disaster regulation hinges on two regulatory techniques, ‘disapplication’ and ‘exculpation’, both of which involve a deviation from the ordinary application of a norm owing to the occurrence of a disaster or to measures adopted by a state in relation to it. It proceeds to outline the various doctrines and mechanisms across different subfields of international law, including international human rights law, investment law and trade law, which may operationalize these techniques in disaster situations. Finally, it argues that the applicability of certain disapplication and exculpation mechanisms to disasters relies on an anachronistic view of such disasters as rare and episodic occurrences beyond human control. This puts these mechanisms at odds with the central objectives of international disaster law and their underlying sociological and scientific premises, which emphasize the need for an ‘adaptive’ model of comprehensive and prevention-oriented disaster regulation. Accordingly, this analysis exposes the conceptual limitations of the reactive model for disaster regulation and explains and validates the inclination toward an adaptive model within international disaster law. It also indicates how mechanisms within the reactive model could be recalibrated to better regulate disasters.

States of emergency pose the most significant challenges to the safeguarding of fundamental rights and civil liberties. Crises are generally characterized by a strengthening of the executive to the detriment of judicial authority and parliamentary oversight. One of the immediate consequences of emergencies is the absence of effective domestic mechanisms of supervision of the executive. The gradual replacement of the judicial role with police operations represents a symptom of how prolonged emergencies prompt the eclipse of legal certainty and lead to the rapid and irreversible degradation of public institutions.

This Article addresses the difficult compromise between defending national interests and protecting individual rights during public emergencies. It analyzes the common features across the recent derogations and exceptional measures of Ukraine, France, and Turkey. The derogations submitted by the three countries in question, together with the exceptional measures adopted for counter-terrorism purposes, substantially restrict several fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). In particular, preventive detention measures, with the suspension of the habeas corpus otherwise approved by the three States, not only enable police forces to use arbitrary and unlimited use of force, but also seriously affect the protection of absolute and non-derogable rights. The Article concludes that, as the recent emergency laws and their widespread and apparently indiscriminate implementation present the risk of destabilizing the whole European system of protection, it becomes ever more necessary that the European Court of Human Rights depart from its previous jurisprudence and adopt a more rigorous and principled scrutiny of the derogation conditions under Article 15 of the Convention.

On June 3, 2016, the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court) rendered its first default judgment, in a case brought by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) against Libya for alleged violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter). The Commission had alleged that the Libyan government had violated its obligations under the Charter to protect one of its citizens, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi, from incommunicado detention and to provide him access to counsel. When Libya failed to respond to the Commission's complaint and to the Court's order of provisional measures, the Court proceeded to the merits and found Libya in violation of several articles of the Charter. Its decision reflected both a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights obligations even in situations of exceptional political and security instability.

When the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) released a letter in early 2012 addressing the financial and economic crises, it was long overdue. Finally, and around four and a half years after the crises began, the body responsible for monitoring those rights that had been most severely impacted had spoken. But what had been said? This article examines the alterations to the doctrine of non-retrogression that the 2012 Letter instigated. It does so by reference to the ‘Business as Usual’ and ‘accommodation’ theories of emergency response. The Letter to States is argued to have taken the Committee away from an approach to non-retrogression that treated times of normality and emergency in a similar way, and towards an approach that allows derogation-style deviations from the Covenant. This, it is argued, could have detrimental effects for the protection of economic and social rights. The difficulties in applying such an approach are considered.

Leading human rights treaties permit states as a temporary measure to suspend a variety of human rights guarantees during national crises. This chapter argues that human rights derogation is best justified as a temporary mechanism for empowering states to protect human rights, rather than as a device for enabling national authorities to advance their own interests in a manner that compromises human rights protection. Human rights treaties use broad legal standards to entrust states with responsibility for deciding what measures are best calculated to maximise human right protection during emergencies. For this delegation of authority to operate effectively, international tribunals must accord a healthy measure of deference to state derogations. Deference to state derogations is not warranted, however, if circumstances suggest that national authorities are not prepared to serve as impartial, rights-optimising trustees for their people.

As a subject of international law, the refugee is inherently temporary: refugee status exists in order to fill the gap caused by a breakdown of the normal bond between citizen and state with ‘international protection’, until this bond can be restored, either with the original state of nationality, or with another state. While this ambition is clear, the practice of refugee protection under the current, post-1951 regime has exposed the serious problem international refugee law (IRL) faces with regard to the tail-end of protection, also known as ‘durable solutions’. This chapter studies the most prominent attempt made by UNHCR and states within the refugee regime at re-invigorating the temporary character of international protection—namely the mechanism known as ‘temporary protection’. While the concept can be traced to formulations of ‘temporary refuge’ in the 1980s, temporary protection (TP) truly emerged as a term of art in the 1990s, as Western Europe was faced with a large-scale influx of forced migrants from the former Yugoslavia. In 2001, TP was the subject of an EU directive, which partly clarified the relationship of TP to mainstream IRL—notably whether TP should be seen as a substitute for, or a prelude to, the operation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Ambiguity has remained the hallmark of the TP concept, however, not least in UNHCR’s attempts at formalising a TP regime outside the European ambit. After examining the main features of these attempts, the chapter concludes that, while the EU directive should be taken seriously, a continuing doctrine of temporary protection outside established IRL is both legally unsound and politically unconvincing.

In July 2001 the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights issued a General Comment on the possibility of member states derogating from human rights in case of emergency. Basing its analysis on the issue of limitation of fair trial rights during a state of emergency, this article suggests a critical analysis of the reasoning, rather than the conclusions, of the Committee. Expanding arguments developed by monitoring bodies of the American and European Conventions on Human Rights, the author suggests alternative reasoning according to which the right to a fair trial is inalienable. She argues in particular that this right constitutes a guarantee necessary to the effective enjoyment of all human rights, the preservation of legality in a democratic society, and the effectiveness of the principle of separation of powers.