Founded by the Constitution of the year III, and with the executive power divided between five Directors, and the legislative power divided into two houses, the Directory sought political middle ground. It defied at the same time the “Jacobins” of Babeuf’s conspiracy and the constitutional circles, and the royalists of the Philanthropic Institute, who were ready to seize power by means of elections or force. In the name of this double danger, real or supposed, the Directors set up coups d’état to nullify election results by associating themselves with generals haloed by their expeditions and their victories abroad (in Egypt or the “sister-republics”). The Directory tried to muzzle the press, supervise the theater, multiply the official celebrations, and reform primary and secondary education. It tried in vain to spread a national religion (theophilanthropy) to control public opinion, to favor a republican elite, to tie scholars to the regime. In charge of a society marked by strong contrasts between the new rich who benefited from the development of the arts, and those left behind (the downgraded, unemployed, deserters, emigrants), it was confronted with corruption and brigandage.

This chapter investigates how Napoleon funded his war effort during the fifteen years that he was in power. Coming to power in the wake of the French monarchy’s financial insolvency and the profound turmoil of the French Revolution, Napoleon chose to become personally involved in financial affairs of the nation, opting for radical but effective solutions. This aspect of his accomplishments is usual forgotten. This is all the more unfair as his successes were real and stark. By rationalizing old principles, the winner of Austerlitz gave himself the means to embody the “God of war” but failed to win the battle for credit due in large part to the disastrous legacy he received from regimes that had preceded him.