Energy technologies are ‘the combination of hardware, techniques, skills, methods and processes’ involved in ‘producing, transforming, storing, transporting and using energy’. The IEA database captures over 500 mature and immature ‘clean energy’ technologies worldwide that contribute to achieving the goal of net-zero emissions. This chapter will show that international economic law is applicable to government interventions in even the early stages of technology development. For example, State-imposed R&D investment obligations may be banned by IIA provisions on performance requirements, and public incentives for R&D may be disciplined by WTO subsidy rules. Once commercialized, green technologies can reach foreign markets due to international trade and technology transfers that fall within the scope of international economic rules. Reducing trade barriers to environmental goods and services could give a further boost to the international movement of energy-related green technologies. While the importance of green technology transfers between countries is widely recognized, trade and investment rules must be consulted when imposing technology transfer measures.

The global economy is in the midst of the Services Revolution, which is having as dramatic an effect on our work life and daily life as the Industrial Revolution 100–150 years ago. Services make the world go around, for consumers, businesses, and governments.

Just think of your daily routine. First thing in the morning, you wake up knowing that your family was safe because of the electronic security service that was monitoring everything while you slept, from the locks on your doors to the carbon monoxide in the garage. Then you probably check your e-mail, the football or cricket results, and the headlines from the Financial Times on your smartphone service. If you drive to work, you require car insurance; if you take the subway or bus, life insurance. On the way to the office, you stop at your favorite coffee bar for your breakfast. At the office, you put the box of that birthday tie return in the express delivery pick-up box. A quick check online of your bank balance. Then you place calls to everyone who left you voicemails overnight, using one of the international telecommunications services.

It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members.

This chapter shows how conflict between the American hegemon and a rising China led to the collapse of the Doha Round (2001–11) and the breakdown of the WTO’s core negotiation function. At the center of the Doha standoff, I argue, is a dispute between the US and China centered on how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system. China has maintained that, as a developing country, it should be entitled to the special and differential treatment (SDT) promised to developing countries. The US, however, is unwilling to extend such treatment to its chief rival, and therefore refused to conclude the round without greater market opening from China. China rejected American demands that it undertake additional liberalization concessions, and, in doing so, showed that it has sufficient power to refuse to concede to US demands that it views as fundamentally against its own development interests. The US has a long track record of successfully overpowering opposition in multilateral trade negotiations and securing assent for its desired outcomes. Yet, in contrast with the past, the US has been unable to overpower China, and this deep and lasting impasse between the two powers resulted in the collapse of the Doha Round.