Argued December 13, 1971.Reargued October 11, 1972.Decided January 22, 1973.

Justice MURRAY, concurring in the judgment.1

Since 1854, Texas, like many other American jurisdictions, has made it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except with respect to “an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Tex. Penal Code Arts. 1191–94, 1196 (1961). Petitioner Jane Roe is an unmarried woman living in Dallas County, Texas. She alleges that, unmarried and pregnant, she sought to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions.” She was unable to secure a “legal” abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy. Lacking the resources to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions, she was forced to continue her pregnancy.

These cases are brought here by writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. They arise out of the efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legislature of that state.

Argued March 26, 2003.Decided June 26, 2003.

Justice ROBINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.***

This case requires us to decide whether Texas may criminalize consensual intimate sexual behavior between two men. We apply intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because the Texas law uses a person’s sex to determine the scope of his sexual liberty. Texas has fallen far short of establishing the requisite “exceedingly persuasive justification” to justify this incursion on personal liberty. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

Argued April 10, 1967.Decided June 12, 1967.

Davis, J. delivered the opinion of the Court.*

Appellants challenge a statutory scheme adopted by the Commonwealth of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons whom the Commonwealth assigns to different racial classifications. We conclude that the scheme cannot stand, for it violates principles expressed in our founding documents and definitively embraced when the Nation was reconstructed by constitutional amendment after Confederate secession and Civil War. More specifically, such a statute fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of free people, and it violates our obligation of equal protection and respect for every member of our society.

Argued April 22, 1927.Decided May 2, 1927.

Ms. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.1

This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, by which the defendant in error, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform the operation of salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in error, for the purpose of making her sterile. 143 Va. 310. The case comes here upon the contention that the statute authorizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.

Ms. Justice Lenhardt delivered the opinion of the Court.1

Imagine a family. Black and poor, its members differ in various ways. But they share a critical connection: a common history and bond. Like many families, especially those of color, they pool their resources, as well as the love they all bring to the endeavor of survival navigating the challenges posed by racial discrimination, poverty, and stigma in a way that makes family flourishing and well-being possible. Coming together in this way means not merely Sunday dinners after church. Those gatherings remain important. They are a source of both connection and renewal. But they stand alongside shared housing; childcare for two boys living without a biological mother and other caregiving; food, and other resources; and emotional support, especially in trying times. Even more, they help to secure a sense of belonging hard to achieve in a context in which poverty and blackness remain disqualifying in so many areas of life.

Argued October 13, 1992.Decided March 23, 1993.

CHACÓN, J. delivered the opinion of the Court.1

This case concerns the liberty interests of children who are being detained by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or “the Service”) pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1988). These children pose no risk of flight and no threat of harm to themselves or to others. Responsible adults are available to receive and care for them. But because they are not citizens and have no legal guardians who can claim them, they are currently being detained, often in troubling conditions, while the government determines whether they are to be deported.

This chapter considers when the government’s speech deprives its targets of life, liberty, or property in violation of the Due Process Clause. It starts with a brief tour of the government’s lies and other falsehoods, illustrating their wide array of audiences, topics, motives, and effects. It then examines the government’s speech that interferes with its listeners’ choices in ways that would violate the Due Process Clause if the government accomplished those same changes through its lawmaking or other regulatory action: examples include law enforcement officers’ lies that coerce their targets’ waiver of constitutional liberties and the government’s lies that deny their targets the ability to exercise reproductive or voting rights. Next, it turns to the expressive harms sometimes inflicted by the government’s speech, investigating whether the government’s speech that shames or humiliates its targets offends due process protections. Finally, it turns fromt the effects of the government's speech to its purposes, exploring whether the Clause limits the government’s speech motivated by its intent to interfere with protected liberties or to inflict injury.