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This chapter discusses the current trends at the reformed Court against the backdrop of recent reform initiatives, as well as the general atmosphere of widespread negative feedback and backlash since the 2010s. To do so, it relies on the results of the content analysis carried out on the case law between 1967 and 2016, a close reading of some of the recent landmark judgments, and the insights gathered from elite interviews conducted with current and former judges. This assessment shows the extent to which the reformed Court resorts to selective forbearance. I find that the reformed Court, challenged by widespread negative feedback, selectively pays heed to member states’ concerns. That is, it continues a progressive line of reasoning when it comes to certain core obligations, such as the obligation to refrain from using excessive force while policing or the provision of legal protection and remedy. Yet, it adopts a more forbearing attitude towards certain other obligations, such as the obligation to uphold the non-refoulement principle, the provision of sufficient medical care in detention centers, or the provision of acceptable detention conditions to (irregular) migrants or asylum seekers.
This chapter is composed of two connected parts. The first part looks at the European Court of Human Rights’ inner workings and the way it functions. Expanding this assessment beyond elected judges, the chapter argues that the Court defines its organizational priorities as a collective body. This collective body includes not only the judges elected for limited terms but also law clerks and other legal professionals at the Registry, most of whom are hired on a permanent basis. This essentially implies that all members of the judicial elite working at the Court contribute to defining the Court’s collective purpose and determining if there is a need for tactical balancing – thus shaping the tendency for forbearance or audacity. The second part offers a historical overview of the Court’s institutional transformation. Created in 1959, the European Court once operated as a part-time institution. The Court then became a full-time institution in 1998; its structure was further refined during the reform processes that officially began with the first High-Level Conference on the Future of the Court in 2010 in Interlaken, Switzerland.
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