States can raise financing through relationships that depend on market accountability or political accountability, respectively, and one can be substituted with the other. In the EU, market accountability as a dominant mode of raising financing has been steadily supplanted in the EU by political accountability in the relationship between debtor states, on the one hand, and creditor states, the EU and the ECB, on the other, thus engendering democratic tensions in the evolution of EU economic governance. One way of solving the widely maligned ‘democratic deficits’ within the EMU would be to restore the market accountability enshrined in the Treaties, as evident in part on the ban on monetary financing, bailouts and state aid. Moreover, market accountability can be likened to the accountability concept of Dawson and Maricut-Akbib, with openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness and publicness underpinning various procedural and substantive dimensions of market accountability.

Affected by the financial crisis and in order to receive financial assistance, several EU member states had to adopt structural adjustment programmes aiming at the reduction of public expenditures. Despite their differences, common feature of all financial assistance schemes was the combination of supranational and international legal instruments and institutions. Newly created financial assistance mechanisms, such as the EFSF and ESM, were created under international law and all financial assistance packages included the participation of the IMF. This hybrid nature of European financial assistance raises the question of whether the actors involved in the award of the assistance are bound by EU human rights. Against this background, this chapter first exposes the doubtful legitimacy of European financial assistance. Second, it analyses the CJEU case law on financial assistance conditionality from a human rights perspective, aiming to respond to the question of whether European actors were and could be bound by human rights when preparing financial assistance conditions. Third, it investigates the possibility of conceiving a legitimate role for courts in applying the procedural and substantive dimension of human rights accountability in times of crisis.

As the most powerful executive actor in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurogroup has faced continuous demands to improve its accountability record since the euro crisis. One reform introduced to meet these demands were the Economic Dialogue – a regular exchange of views between the European Parliament and the President of the Eurogroup designed to ‘ensure greater transparency and accountability’ in the EMU. This chapter investigates the practical functioning of the Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup between 2013 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. Applying the theoretical framework of the introduction, the purpose is to examine the extent to which the Parliament focuses on procedural or substantive accountability when questioning the Eurogroup President. Moreover, the chapter investigates the reasoning of parliamentary questions in line with the four accountability goods identified at the outset (openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness). The findings show that Members of the European Parliament are eager to question the extent to which Eurogroup decisions are substantively open and effective, and to a lesser extent whether they are arbitrary or protect EU interests more generally. The analysis is based on fourteen transcripts of Economic Dialogues with the Eurogroup President, which took place between 2013 and 2019.

Summarizes the expansion of regular and predictable issuance of coupon-bearing Treasury debt, the introduction of STRIPS, foreign-targeted securities, and inflation-protected securities, and the rennovation of the auction process. Reviews the creation of the Government Securities Clearing Corporation.

This chapter discusses the initiation of the euro’s transformation and the shift from negative to positive solidarity, in the form of financial assistance, that it caused. Its origin lies in a historical meeting of the heads of state or government on 11 February 2010. There, the leaders initiated a change in the Founding Contract by jointly committing themselves to safeguard the currency union’s financial stability. The chapter subsequently focuses on the positive solidarity displayed towards distressed member states through various temporary rescue funds. This not only created difficulties for political leaders back home, politically and legally, it also put great strain on the single currency’s legal set-up that still reflected a stability conception from the past. The third part of the chapter therefore discusses how member states tried to take away this strain by incorporating the shift in solidarity in Union law through the creation of Article 136(3) TFEU, allowing member states in the currency union to establish a permanent rescue mechanism. The chapter traces the process and considerations behind both this amendment and the establishment of the mechanism it enabled.

The change in the Founding Contract that political leaders initiated on 11 February 2010 put great pressure on the legal set-up of the euro that remained largely unaffected. When the European Court of Justice had to rule on the actions to which the change had given rise it consequently found itself between a rock and a hard place. It was not in a position to strike down actions that had been crucial to the single currency’s survival. Yet, in order to approve of them it had to engage in a Herculean struggle with the law that still largely reflected a stability conception from the past. This chapter examines this approval. Two cases are central: Pringle and Gauweiler. Both cases ultimately turned around the question whether and to what extent the law can accommodate the currency union’s new stability conception, characterized by the need to protect financial stability. Most of the Court’s reasoning in these cases is sound or, where it is strained, could have been justified through the use of different arguments. At one crucial point, however, the Court encounters the limits of what can be justified through legal reasoning alone.