This chapter will use the historical evolution of fiduciary norms in Japan and East Asia to examine the intersection of fiduciary law and transnational legal ordering theory. Various strands of fiduciary notions arrived in East Asia as part of modernization effort beginning in the late nineteenth century. The civilian regulation of conflicted transactions and duty of care was introduced in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as part of Civil Code and Commercial Code, which was followed by statutory introduction of common law trust in early twentieth century, and American corporate governance theory after World War II. Singapore and Hong Kong adopted English common law and equity jurisprudence along with legislations that follow UK and Commonwealth models, which were frequently updated to meet the demands of international financial market. While tensions among common law, civil law, and indigenous norms were conspicuous during the early phases of modernization and reception, more recent decades of globalization have seen greater scale and dynamics of transnational interactions, most notably the rise of UK-style soft law initiative. Throughout the regional history, fiduciary norms have been shaped by shifting colonial pressures and economic hegemony, wars, revolutions, and financial crises, as well as legislative imitation and academic learning. By way of conclusion, this chapter argues that while fiduciary law presents a rich field for exploring process of transnational legal ordering, the theory of transnational legal ordering provides a valuable framework to understand both historical and contemporary evolution of fiduciary law both in individual jurisdictions and across jurisdictional borders.

Authoritarian legality is widespread, diverse, and enduring in East Asia. This chapter first addresses definitions of authoritarian legality in East Asia. Authoritarian legality falls between liberal rule of law and lawless autocracy. Cases include Hong Kong, Singapore, and more indisputably authoritarian polities in the region. Although exhibiting considerable variation, East Asian authoritarian regimes generally score relatively high in rule-of-law metrics and share several regionally distinctive legal–political characteristics.This chapter then turns to the paradox of why authoritarian rulers and regimes in East Asia would incur the risks and costs associated with increases in, or relatively high levels of, legality. It considers several functions that legality can perform for authoritarian rulers, and discusses examples from historical and contemporary East Asian cases: managing threats to order and security; fostering economic development; strengthening state capacity; legitimating authoritarian rule; and responding to demand for greater legality (from society and from elites, including within the regime).Finally, the chapter considers possible future trajectories for authoritarian legality in East Asia, again drawing on past and current examples: resilience and adaptation; transformation to democratic legality; regime political and legal decay; authoritarianism without legality; and lingering elements of authoritarian legality in a democratized polity.