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In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Cold War convention of containment, which undergirded American involvement in Vietnam, was broadly shared, internalized, at times even fostered, by the United States European allies. This consensus broke down by the 1960s, as successive US administrations saw themselves locked ever more rigidly into Cold War logic which seemed to require going to war to preserve a noncommunist South Vietnam. By contrast, the United States transatlantic allies and partners increasingly came to question the very rationale of US intervention. By the mid-1960s there was a remarkable consensus among government officials across Western Europe on the futility of the central objective of the American intervention in Vietnam of defending and stabilizing a noncommunist (South) Vietnam. European governments refused to send troops to Vietnam. However, West European governments differed considerably in the public attitude they displayed toward US involvement in Vietnam, ranging from France’s vocal opposition to strong if not limitless public support by the British and West German governments. Across Western Europe, the Vietnam War cut deeply into West European domestic politics, aggravated political and societal tensions and diminished the righteousness of the American cause.
In a preliminary assessment drafted in early 1954, Wolf Graf Baudissin, the head of the department within the Amt Blank responsible for developing the concept of Innere Führung noted that the Germans were faced with the difficult choice between "becoming Europeanized" or pursuing "reform". The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) put an end to these worries. The discussions between the Americans and West Germans on the concept of Innere Führung in the years leading up to the creation of the Bundeswehr make clear the complexity of trying to transfer the practices of the American "army within a democracy". The West Germans were concerned about the broad issues of the social integration and legitimation of the armed forces subsumed within the concept of Innere Führung. The Americans took a more narrow approach and viewed the question of civil-military relations as primarily a constitutional issue.
The West German experts envisioned that the Federal Republic would provide the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) with a modern tactical air force for close air support to German army units. The plan to restrict the air force to providing combat support to ground forces stemmed in part from the dominance of infantry and artillery experts in the West Germans' discussions and the lessons they had drawn from their World War II experiences. It also reflected the scant attention the Jahrbuch der Luftwaffe had given to aerial doctrine and the theory of airpower during the 1930s and 1940s. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) began a program within the framework of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in 1953 to train pilots and technicians from NATO member states at air bases in Bavaria. The scale of American materiel and training support reduced their chances to influence German air potential.
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