The chapter offers an in-depth qualitative study of the negotiations over the EU financial framework for the period 2007-2013, which is based on both archival research and secondary resources. The case studyillustrates how governments signal responsiveness before elections: that is, how governments decide on what strategies to pursue, and how cooperation and conflict can shape the negotiations and the policy outcomes. The study focuses on national elections in three countries that represented opposite positions at the bargaining table, and illustrates the variety of ways that EU negotiations work in the shadow of national elections. EU governments that faced elections used several strategies to signal responsiveness to their constituents. Some tried to ensure increased benefits that would make them look successful at home (i.e., Germany and Poland), whereas others tried to delay the negotiations or agreements until after elections to avoid being blamed for their lack of success in defending national interests at home (i.e., United Kingdom). Some used their bargaining leverage against the interests of other EU governments, whereas others relied on the hidden cooperation with other EU member states to secure better deals. Some governments were more effective in achieving successful outcomes for their country, whereas others were less successful in doing so.