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This chapter recounts the domestic and international strategies Armstrongs and Vickers used in seeking armaments sales. They used strategies of cultivating relations with domestic and international elites (facilitated abroad by ambassador-agents and bribery), trying to exclude competitors from markets, cooperating and colluding with firms they could not exclude, diversifying during order famines, providing financing, and innovating to have attractive armaments to sell. Considering the independence and power of Armstrongs and Vickers, the book shows that for much of the century the firms were independent actors because the British Government was guided by laissez-faire and class prejudices and took no interest in the firms’ survival. In parallel, Armstrongs and Vickers pursued independent foreign policies that sometimes angered the British Government. Turning to the power of armament firms, Armstrongs and Vickers did occasionally demonstrate some “relational power” in their dealings with the British Government. However, they rarely got what they wanted from their negotiations with the state, so even their “relational power” was limited. Armstrongs and Vickers had tried to get more weapons spending and to prevent enquiries into their behavior; however, they failed, showing they did not wield “agenda setting” power. “Ideological” power was completely beyond armament firms.
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