While the motivations of individuals to become foreign fighters have been at the forefront of academic interest, an important motive—revenge—has so far remained under-researched. Drawing on the case study of pro-Ukrainian Chechen foreign fighters self-deployed in the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War, this article seeks to fill the gap in the extant literature by identifying and conceptualizing revenge. This article posits that two intertwined motives—revenge for perceived historical injustices and revenge for personal wrongs—have played an important role in motivating Chechens to become foreign fighters in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. This article suggests that while revenge might be a potent driving force of foreign fighting, its appeal may be stronger in the cultures of honor with the persisting notion of retaliation.

Since the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) as one of the leading insurgent forces in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s, the academic literature has increasingly focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Most studies have analyzed transnational insurgents joining the ISIS; however, research on non-jihadi foreign fighters remains underdeveloped. The article sheds much-needed light on the factors motivating non-jihadi fighters to join conflicts abroad. Specifically, it presents the findings of an in-depth analysis of the factors leading Italian nationals to join the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG/YPJ)1 after 2011, their military contribution on the battlefield, and their reasons for returning to Italy. The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it enriches our general understanding of the motivations of non-jihadi foreign fighters through detailed qualitative analysis, including first-hand accounts and an analysis of fighters' biographies. Second, it offers a more complete picture of the specific factors informing the Italian experience of transnational non-jihadi fighters in recent years. The qualitative data highlight the role of non-material factors in triggering the armed mobilization of foreign fighters. The findings indicate that the Italian foreign fighters contingent within the YPG/YPJ and the SDF has been highly committed, made up mostly of young males with no military experience, and had little to no impact on the battlefield.

The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have led to concerns in the West over ‘foreign fighters’. Although states are anxious about the role these individuals play in the conflicts they join, their primary concern relates to the perceived ‘terrorist’ threat they pose on their return. This fear has led to an evolution in the international policymaking arena, with foreign fighters now often referred to as ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (FTFs). A Critical Theory-inspired immanent critique is offered to highlight various problems that exist with the FTF term and to argue policymakers should resist its use. The article demonstrates the importance of language by showing how the invocation of the FTF threat has strengthened the ongoing development of globally coordinated counterterrorism action. Specifically, it argues UN Security Council Resolution 2178, agreed in 2014, generates a legal obligation upon UN member states to implement new counterterrorism laws at national level to combat the perceived threat from FTFs. The article highlights the negative effect these laws have on human rights. It is argued institutions like the UN need to ensure new counterterrorism legal instruments are built from a human rights rather than security-first perspective if commitments to human rights in transnational counterterrorism are to be fully realised.

In 2014, the USA initiated the formation of a multilateral military operation against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Eventually, more than 70 states joined the anti-Daesh coalition. However, contributions to the military effort have been characterized by great variance, especially among EU member states. While some states took leading roles in the airstrikes, others provided training for Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and still others did not get involved beyond voicing their support for the policy. Against this backdrop, this article makes a two-fold contribution to the literature on military coalitions and security policy. Empirically, the article provides a mapping of the then 28 EU member states’ military engagement in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Analytically, fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is applied to account for the observed pattern of military involvement, using an integrative framework that combines international and domestic factors. The results demonstrate that multiple paths led towards EU military involvement in the anti-Daesh coalition. At the same time, international-level incentives, such as external threat and/or alliance value feature prominently in all three identified paths. The analysis further underscores the value of a configurational perspective, because neither an external threat nor alliance value are sufficient on their own to bring about the outcome. Across the set-theoretic configurations, these conditions either combine with other ‘push’ factors or with the absence of constraints against military involvement. In line with the latter, the article highlights the policy relevance of institutional constraints, especially legislative veto rights, since most of those countries that were involved in the airstrikes of the anti-Daesh coalition did not have formal parliamentary involvement on matters of military deployment policy.

This article poses the question as to whether and why States overlook the prosecution of people for war crimes rather than terrorist offences, where war crimes would be preferred. It looks at whether a diverse range of States (Afghanistan, Australia, Mali, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation) are able through their domestic legislation to prosecute people for war crimes or for terrorist offences. It considers what the value of prosecutions is theoretically and legally, and what the impact of prosecutions is practically in a State. It proposes that prosecutors, police and judges should ask the question whether an alleged offender should be prosecuted for war crimes and/or terrorist offences with war crimes being the preferred option where there is evidence that they have been committed.

Gilles de Kerchove was appointed European Union (EU) Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (EU CTC) on 19 September 2007. In this function, he coordinates the work of the EU in the field of counterterrorism (CT), maintains an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal, closely monitors the implementation of the EU CT strategy and fosters better communication between the EU and third countries to ensure that the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism.

He was previously Director for Justice and Home Affairs at the EU Council General Secretariat (1995–2007) and Deputy Secretary of the Convention which drafted the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU (1999–2000). Before that he was Head of the Private Office of the Deputy Prime-Minister of the Federal Government of Belgium, Minister of Justice and Minister of Economic Affairs (1993–1995) and Head of the Private Office of the Deputy Prime-Minister of the Federal Government of Belgium, Minister of Justice and Minister of SMEs (1989–1992).

Mr de Kerchove is a Professor of European Law at the Université Catholique de Louvain, at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and at the Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles.

He has published a number of books and numerous articles on European law, human rights, security and CT.

This article will briefly present a number of international human rights law considerations related to the topic of citizenship stripping of foreign fighters, that is: “individuals, driven mainly by ideology, religion and/or kinship, who leave their country of origin or their country of habitual residence to join a party engaged in an armed conflict”, most notably the conflict in Syria and Iraq. After that, the article will focus on considerations in the context of international humanitarian law, which have been less frequently the subject of academic debate. This contribution concludes that citizenship stripping is not only highly problematic under international human rights law, but also from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The measure – which is likely to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – violates Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions, but it also undermines accountability for international humanitarian law violations already committed and can engender new violations through the non-removal of the suspect from the conflict zone. One of the few positive sides of the connection between the measure and international humanitarian law is that even if nationality is deprived, this will not have an effect on the international humanitarian law obligation to treat that deprived person humanely. In that sense, international humanitarian law provides a welcome – albeit temporary – safety net of decent treatment for people who have become victims of countries’ refusal to take responsibility for their own citizens.

Contemporary foreign fighters (FFs) often join so-called dual-nature groups, i.e. groups that can at the same time be qualified as a non-State armed group involved in a non-international armed conflict and a terrorist organization. Both international humanitarian law and counterterrorism (CT) legislation may hence be of relevance when assessing the legality of FF conduct. The CT perspective tends to remain predominant, however. This paper argues that, especially in terms of prosecution, due regard must be paid to both legal frameworks where possible. It also argues that national prosecution in the country of origin seems to offer the best prospects for realizing such cumulative prosecution.

The return of foreign fighters and their families to the European Union has mostly been considered a security threat by member States, which consequently adopt repressive measures aimed at providing an immediate, short-term response to this perceived threat. In addition to this strong-arm approach, reintegration strategies have also been used to prevent returnees from falling back into terrorism and to break down barriers of hostility between citizens in the long term. Amidst these different strategies, this paper seeks to identify which methods are most desirable for handling returnees.

This article analyses the decisions of Belgian and Dutch courts concerning the repatriation of the family members of foreign fighters who are now detained in dire conditions in North-East Syria. The article shows that, under international law, these women and children have no individual right to be repatriated by their State of nationality, based on either consular assistance, the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties, or the right of return to one's own country. Nonetheless there are good reasons why States should exercise their prerogative to repatriate.

This Article discusses the constitutionality of the recently implemented § 89a IIa of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch—StGB) on the basis of the case 3 StR 326/16 decided by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) on April 6, 2017. First, this Article introduces § 89a IIa of the StGB with a short summary of the events leading to the present anti-terrorist legislation in Germany and the development of the legislation over the past few decades. Second, the facts of the BGH’s case will be outlined, and an overview of the systematic structure of § 89a I, II No. 1, IIa StGB will be provided. Within this framework, the constitutionality of § 89a IIa StGB will be discussed, focusing on the prerequisite of appropriateness, with special attention paid to the requirement of reasonability and the prerequisite of legal certainty pursuant to Article 103(II) Basic Law (Grundgesetz—GG). Finally, § 89a I, II No. 1, IIa StGB will be applied to the BGH’s case after discussing the contentious legal issues regarding these doctrines. This Article concludes by discussing the BGH’s decision, which deems § 89a IIa StGB to be constitutional.

This article examines counter-terrorism efforts in the EU as it matures as a field of law. It sets out three critiques of EU counter-terrorism law: that of ineffectiveness, of anti-constitutionalism, and of contrariness to human rights and the rule of law. It considers these critiques in light of the development of policies and legal initiatives—against foreign terrorist fighters and against radicalisation. It concludes that there are both persistent problems, and some improvements, in the law. The EU's capacity to meet the challenges posed by terrorism and the counter-terrorism imperative, and how it does so, has global impact. The article concludes with an argument for better law-making in the EU to ensure it serves as a better exemplar of transnational law.

Since 2012, it is estimated that 2,000 French nationals have joined jihadist armed groups listed by the UN as terrorist organizations in Syria and in Iraq. Consequently, a new prosecution policy has been introduced in France. To date, more than 200 persons have been prosecuted and 1,600 persons have been placed under criminal investigation. In parallel, after the 13 November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, a State of emergency was declared. Persisting for two years, it introduced derogative administrative measures that slowly transgressed into regular criminal law. Consequently, French administrative and criminal courts, with ordinary judges and professional routines, find themselves involved in matters related to armed conflicts – a completely new phenomenon for them. What role has been performed by French criminal and administrative judges in the global fight against terrorism?

This article takes a close look at France's fight against terrorism and the engagement of its domestic legal system in the context of foreign fighters and suspects of terrorism. It outlines the radicalization processes of French administrative and criminal law along with their hybridization and complementarity. While the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq and the complex geopolitical context are clearly present in French courtrooms, international humanitarian law and international criminal law frameworks are almost entirely absent. At the same time, by granting a growing power to the administration, the repressive and pre-emptive approaches introduced within criminal and administrative law transform liberal conceptions of law and justice.

This article considers which legal regimes apply in cases where a Danish citizen and/or resident returns from Syria or Iraq after having taken part in the armed conflict on behalf of the group known as Islamic State, and continues his/her affiliation with the armed group. The article argues that international humanitarian law currently applies to the Danish territory and that a Danish foreign fighter may continue to be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities after having returned from Iraq or Syria. The article then considers the application of Danish criminal law to returned foreign fighters and argues that Danish counterterrorism laws do not apply to members of the armed forces of an armed group that is party to an armed conflict with Denmark.