This article suggests a new interpretative framework for Article 27(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits sexual violence against women in armed conflict. One specific aspect of this norm is particularly controversial: the notion of ‘honour’ has often been criticised as an obsolete concept linked to an outdated view of female morality. In the absence of a definition of the term, this article examines whether the gendered limitations of the norm can be overcome and the extent to which an evolutive interpretation of the concept is feasible. It argues that the concept of ‘honour’ can be treated as a generic term that is subject to evolutive interpretation, allowing for a renewed and gender-sensitive understanding to be developed, aligned with the concept of human dignity.

The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides a practical and effective framework for the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts that has retained its relevance for 75 years since its adoption. As with all treaties, its ‘object and purpose’ has a concrete impact on how its terms are interpreted, giving insights into the ordinary meaning of the text and allowing the aim of the Convention to be fully realized. This article asks and answers a series of questions to elucidate the role of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation and how to identify the object and purpose of a given treaty before focusing on the specificities of international humanitarian law treaties. On that basis, it determines that the overall ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention is to protect civilians during armed conflict, including in circumstances where they are subject to permissible measures of control and security. The article then demonstrates how that ‘object and purpose’ assists with the resolution of specific, well-known interpretive dilemmas including the determination of protected status under the Convention and the application of provisions premised on the existence of a Protecting Power.

International humanitarian law (IHL) categorically prohibits all types of collective punishment. However, neither treaty nor customary sources provide a clear definition of what should be deemed a collective punishment. Given this lack of clarity, it is no surprise that little attention has been paid to the way in which resorting to different forms of collective punishment during a belligerent occupation might lead to additional violations of international law, including IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). This article explores the notion of collective punishment under the law of occupation and connects it with other relevant rules of international law. Based on this analysis, and using the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a case study, the article argues that violating the prohibition of collective punishment in a situation of belligerent occupation in all likelihood will trigger the breach of other concomitant rules of IHL and IHRL, thus shedding light on the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Humanitarian assistance is essential for the survival of the civilian population and people hors de combat in the theatre of war. Its regulation under the laws of armed conflict tries to achieve a balance between humanitarian goals and state sovereignty. This balance, reflected in the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, is not as relevant to contemporary armed conflicts, most of which involve non-state armed groups. Even those provisions relating to humanitarian assistance in conflicts involving non-state armed groups fail to address properly the key features of these groups, and especially their territorial aspect. This article proposes a different approach, which takes into consideration and gives weight to the control exercised by non-state armed groups over a given territory. Accordingly, it is suggested that provisions regulating humanitarian relief operations in occupied territories should apply to territories controlled by armed groups. This approach views international humanitarian law first and foremost as an effective, realistic and practical branch of law. Moreover, it has tremendous humanitarian advantages and reflects the aims and purposes of the law, while considering the factual framework of these conflicts.

Since 1977 Israel has pursued an open policy of settlement building in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Although the Security Council determined that this action constituted a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel continued to settle its nationals and new Jewish immigrants in these territories.

The approval by the Israeli government on 26 February 1997 of a disputed plan to settle a colony in Djabal Abou Ghounaym, in the south of Jerusalem, led to a draft resolution being submitted to the Security Council, which was not adopted due to the repeated veto of the United States on 5 and 21 March 1997.

The issuance by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of its Advisory Opinion on the consequences of Israel's construction of the separation barrier in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) raises myriad legal questions worth addressing. This paper focuses on one of the key claims made by Israel and a number of other states since the request for an Advisory Opinion was brought before the Court: whether the involvement of the Court in the issue of the construction of the barrier constituted an obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace.