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A new reciprocity formula for Dirichlet L-functions associated to an arbitrary primitive Dirichlet character of prime modulus q is established. We find an identity relating the fourth moment of individual Dirichlet L-functions in the t-aspect to the cubic moment of central L-values of Hecke–Maaß newforms of level at most
$q^{2}$
and primitive central character
$\psi ^{2}$
averaged over all primitive nonquadratic characters
$\psi $
modulo q. Our formula can be thought of as a reverse version of recent work of Petrow–Young. Direct corollaries involve a variant of Iwaniec’s short interval fourth moment bound and the twelfth moment bound for Dirichlet L-functions, which generalise work of Jutila and Heath-Brown, respectively. This work traverses an intersection of classical analytic number theory and automorphic forms.
This chapter turns to the question of how the judgment of taste is related to cognition and to the larger conception of judgment discussed in Chapter 2. It offers a new reading and contextualization of the argument of §21, in the Fourth Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful, which establishes a “common sense” as a necessary condition of the universal communicability of cognition. On my reading, Kant does not provide, or seek to provide, a deduction of the judgment of taste avant la lettre. His point, instead, is to show that cognition involves its own form of reflective judgment. Cognitive judgment considered from the perspective of the third Critique – actual, situated judgment – depends on a norm beyond that of correctness: of aptness or appropriateness; of what calls for judgment. My reading is an alternative not only to the widespread “aesthetic” construal of Kant’s argument, on which it is meant to establish an aesthetic common sense, but also to the “epistemic” construal proposed by Henry Allison, on which it is meant to establish an epistemic common sense.
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