This article examines conditionalities in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in light of the European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC – Tariff Preferences) case at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The article largely undertakes this examination from the point of view of developing countries. It mainly examines the issue of discrimination in conditionalities since this was the principal question raised in the EC – Tariff Preferences case and makes suggestions regarding the regulation of conditionalities. In doing so, the article follows two trajectories: first, it makes suggestions for the WTO panels and Appellate Body, and, second, it makes suggestions for GSP donors, by analyzing the new European GSP + Scheme and by drawing inspiration from conditionalities in the loans granted by the World Bank.

In a proceeding that challenged the domestic content requirements (DCRs) of India's solar energy program, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) upheld the panel determination that the Indian government's measures violated its international obligations. The decision offers new insights into certain exceptions for environmental policies under the multilateral trading system and elaborates on the relevance of other international legal regimes to the compliance issue under WTO law. Further, it has the potential to increase export opportunities of many countries in the Indian renewable energy market.

In a proceeding brought against the People’s Republic of China by the United States (in which Japan and the European Union joined), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled that China violated its obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT)1 by imposing export restrictions on “rare earths,” minerals used in mobile phones, hybrid cars, and other high-tech products. In upholding the earlier decision of a WTO dispute settlement panel, the Appellate Body rejected China’s argument that export duties, quotas, and other restrictions could be justified by health and environmental concerns.

On May 22, 2014, the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body (AB) issued its report on the controversial “ECSeal Products” dispute, finding that a European Union (EU or Union) prohibition on the importation and sale of seal products violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). It did so, however, in a way that largely upheld the Union”s defense on animal welfare grounds, so that the prohibition remains effective. The decision marks the first time that the Appellate Body has found that a trade ban on animal welfare grounds falls within the exception under GATT Article XX(a) for measures necessary to protect public morals. This determination implicates the legality of future trade restrictions on animal welfare grounds, as well as restrictions imposed on human rights grounds, such as labor rights.

The GATT 1994 and the GATS contain separate multilateral rules on trade in goods and services. The question arises as to whether the GATT 1994 and the GATS are therefore mutually exclusive. This paper argues that the GATT 1994 and the GATS should be mutually exclusive in the application of their respective obligations to the specific aspects of any given measure. The paper offers a test, based on a similar test applied under EC law, to determine which of the agreements should apply to the specific aspects of any given measure where it appears to affect both trade in goods and services.

The Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO Agreement represents a significant shift from a diplomatic model of dispute settlement to a rule-based model. The substitution of legal legitimacy for political legitimacy in the dispute settlement process makes the success or failure of the system largely dependent on the credibility of the jurisprudence produced by the panels and Appellate Body. One way which international tribunals have established credible jurisprudence, is by following their previous decisions unless there is good reason for deciding otherwise. This paper examines the precedential effect of previously adopted panel and Appellate Body reports, and policy reasons for and against a stronger form of precedent in WTO jurisprudence.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) began more as a diplomatic forum where parties compromised disagreements than a court that settled them. The term ‘conciliation’ was used more frequently to describe the process than the term ‘dispute settlement’. However, over nearly half a century as the focal point of international trade law and diplomacy, GATT's dispute settlement procedures moved decidedly, if not steadily, from the diplomatic to the juridical. With the adoption of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), the juridical model clearly has prevailed.

For several years, there has been a tension between differing philosophies of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement. Commentators have taken different views on whether the system was fundamentally based on an arbitration or a judicial model. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex II to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), represents the first extensive, negotiated agreement revitalizing the dispute settlement system in the history of the General Agreement. It represents nothing less than a complete reform of the GATT dispute settlement system. What is remarkable is that it is the product of extensive multilateral negotiations. In the past, modifications were made to the system on an incremental, case-by-case basis. Since the GATT came into existence in 1948, Articles XXII and XXIII have formed the basis of the dispute settlement mecha-nism. They are very sparse provisions, and most of the procedures that have come to characterize the pre-WTO GATT system have evolved over time as a result of experience in specific cases. Some of these procedural improvements were codified in Decisions and Understandings negotiated at various points in GATT history, but none were as comprehensive as the DSU.

The European Community (EC) has recently announced its decision to begin dispute-resolution procedures in the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the United States (US) because of the latter's passage of the so-called ‘Helms-Burton’ law, which tightens the sanctions against Cuba by means of extraterritorial application. This will, in all probability, offer the WTO an ideal opportunity to define the limits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) security exception. The security exception, contained in GATT Article XXI, is also included in other agreements annexed to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). It provides an exception from all GATT (as well as GATS and TRIPs) obligations, including the all-important ‘most-favoured-nation’ non-discrimination rule. The security interests at issue must be those of a political, rather than an economic, nature. It should be noted that because there is no human rights and democracy exception to the GATT or other agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, trade restrictions that are based either in whole or in part on these concerns, such as the measures against Cuba, are usually justified on the basis of the security exception.