Amidst the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the German Federal Constitutional Court rendered a little-noticed, but potentially far-reaching decision regarding European integration. When it declared the law ratifying the Unitary Patent Court Agreement unconstitutional, it did so because it is a treaty “supplementing or being otherwise closely tied to the EU”, in other words, a satellite treaty, inter-se agreement, or more generally: an international law agreement furthering European integration outside the EU law framework. This commonly used integration technique is therefore going to be a lot more difficult in future whenever Germany is involved. At the same time, the court order gives all German citizens a far-reaching right to have laws ratifying such treaties checked before the Constitutional Court, which is a significant extension compared to its earlier case-law. In future cases of disagreement, EU Member States may have to find different ways to proceed than resorting to international law, such as using the enhanced cooperation mechanism.

This article examines the relationship between constitutional pluralism and authoritarianism. It does so since the Weiss decision of the FCC spurred unusual attacks on constitutional pluralism. This particular theoretical vision of European integration has been described as inherently dangerous and its abandonment has been called for out of chiefly instrumentalist reasons, in order to prevent constitutional pluralism turning into an autocrats’ refuge. The article argues this critique of constitutional pluralism does not succeed. Due to its truncated, exclusively positivist understanding of constitutional pluralism, it has failed to take into account pluralism’s normative core. The latter presents itself an antipode to authoritarianism, which means that the autocratic regimes simply cannot credibly avail themselves of the theory of constitutional pluralism to justify their authoritarian actions.

On May 5, 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court issued the PSPP decision, sending shock waves through the European Union. This contribution analyzes the consequences of the PSPP decision for the future relationship between the German FCC and the CJEU and for European integration as a whole. The article consists of four parts. First, I will provide some context and model the interaction between domestic and international courts from a rational choice perspective. Second, I will recapitulate some core aspects of the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the CJEU in particular. I argue that the relationship between both courts had evolved into a strategic equilibrium in which it was costly not to respect the decision of the other party. The third section then looks for reasons why Karlsruhe nevertheless deviated from this equilibrium despite the significant costs involved. The fourth section, finally, considers the way ahead and analyzes what possible consequences for the future relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court and the CJEU.

This contribution explores paradoxes of ultra vires review with specific regard to the PSPP decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the light of the decision’s initial reception. While some of these paradoxes are inherent in the very nature of ultra vires review, others are specific to the PSPP judgment. They relate to the underlying doctrinal and theoretical premises, to key concepts such as proportionality or the scope of judicial review, to the overall context in which the decision is embedded, and even to the community which is addressed and affected by the decision. It is the sad irony that the Federal Constitutional Court, while accusing others of manifestly exceeding their competences, does not sufficiently adhere to its own standards and increasingly risks overstretching the boundaries of its mandate under the Basic Law.

The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Right to be forgotten II case is an example of constitutional pluralism in action. It demonstrates how a pluralist-minded court can elevate itself from and above the constitutional confines of its own legal order. By integrating the material standards of another legal order in its own review of constitutionality a national constitutional court contributes directly to the strengthening of the fundamental rights of individuals against the national authorities within the overall system of European legal order.

This article discusses two landmark judgements by the German Federal Constitutional Court (CC) on the relationship between domestic and EU fundamental rights protection (Right to be forgotten I and II). In these judgements, for the first time, the CC uses EU fundamental rights as a standard of review. In addition, the CC establishes a novel framework of “parallel applicability” of EU and domestic fundamental rights for subject matters that are not fully harmonized by EU law. The article first presents the new approach, showing that it structurally changes the parameters of the relationship between the CC and the CJEU. Second, the article assesses the legal-political tendency reflected in this change: is this constructive dialogue or rather pushback against the CJEU? The article argues that this new jurisprudence should be characterized as an instance of resistance. The CC resists against the CJEU in its function as fundamental rights court, attempting to reduce the authority of the CJEU and reversing a development that it considered to be unfavourable to its own authority. This is structural pushback aimed at the CJEU’s function rather than at individual decisions or norms - however, without rejection the CJEU as an institution altogether.

The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, more commonly known as the Fiscal Compact, and the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) are closely linked in several ways. Both treaties are formally placed outside the European Union framework, but substantively govern Union matters. Together they are designed to combat the sovereign debt crisis which has been ravaging the European Union for years now. The Fiscal Compact does so by enhancing and sharpening budgetary discipline in the Eurozone states, the ESM Treaty by offering assistance to Eurozone states in financial distress. To receive financial aid from the ESM, states not only need to have ratified the Fiscal Compact, but also to have implemented a balanced budget rule in their national law in the way the Compact demands. Apart from combating the crisis, the Treaties also bring reforms to the Eurozone; they express the wish of the signatory parties to share their destinies in new ways.

About one year after the European Court of Justice had handed down its notorious decision on the Data Retention Directive concerning telecommunications traffic data, it was for the German Federal Constitutional Court to take a final decision on the German implementation of the Directive. So far, the latter Court had only issued temporary injunctions restricting data retrieval by the public authorities. Now, the final ruling by the Court has been anxiously awaited since the complainants had not only challenged the German provisions implementing the Directive, but also the Directive itself. Thus, the question was raised whether the Court would finally, for the first time in its history, initiate a preliminary ruling procedure according to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.