The Cold War constituted one of the most significant factors in the meteoric rise of the German and Japanese economies after 1945. It was a primary motivation for the US redefinition of both countries as partners rather than pariahs, and both could then leverage the institutions and structures of the US-led capitalist world to maximum advantage. The United States also provided military protection for the two countries, enabling them to recalibrate their political–economic systems decisively away from their pre-war national security orientation to a commercial one. However, the end of the Cold War changed everything rapidly and fundamentally. The opening of the old Soviet bloc along with the rise of China presented extensive market opportunities, but simultaneously produced potential new competitors, while Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism has challenged German and Japanese cooperative capitalisms. For Germany in particular, the post-Cold War landscape has involved expensive reunification along with growing numbers of refugees. Globalisation has thus been a double-edged sword, undercutting the high-wage societies of Deutschland AG and Japan, Inc. Scaling back of US military commitments, moreover, have also led to Germany and Japan spending more money defending themselves, as well as to deployment of troops for the first time since 1945.

Now that more than thirty years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear that, while some borders have disappeared, new fronts have appeared as well. And, rather than a “new world order,” a familiar antagonism between Russia and the West is once again asserting itself. Among the central points of dispute is the question of whether the West offered Moscow assurances in 1989-90 in the form of a NATO non-expansion guarantee. Diverging interpretations of this crucial development continue to hinder international understanding and dialogue. In this chapter, Sarotte draws on elements of her historical research into archives in six countries to present evidence on what actually transpired, and to discuss the following questions: To what extent do current challenges for European security policy still have roots in the decisions and commitments of the powers involved in the process of German reunification thirty years ago? How did the Clinton administration come to support full Article 5 NATO enlargement rather than NATO’s Partnership for Peace? And what can we learn from those events to address the challenges of today?

The Cold War’s denouement not only saw profound political changes throughout Eurasia, but an unprecedented power shift resulting from the Soviet Union’s decline that ultimately ushered in the United States’ “unipolar era.” Nevertheless, the United States’ response to the late Cold War power shift remains underexplored. This chapter fills the gap by examining the processes by which the United States recognized the power shift underway and adapted its foreign policy. I make three arguments. First, American policymakers in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations acknowledged that Soviet decline rebounded to the United States’ geopolitical advantage. Second, American policymakers responded by exploiting Soviet problems, driven by recognition that Soviet decline allowed for American gains, yet worried that the window for gains would soon close. Third, this effort altered European security, as the United States undercut the Soviet Union as a challenger while fostering conditions that could allow it to dominate European security irrespective of whether Soviet problems continued. Put simply, the United States used the Soviet decline to reify American advantages in Europe, garnering oversight over a region that had long been the cockpit of geopolitical contestation. The result meant that unipolarity also translated into American near-hegemony in Europe.

Chapter six interrogates the place of the environment and environmental movements in the end of communism and then in the double transitions to democracy and capitalism. First, the chapter charts the end of communism in Poland—where the dismantling of the Soviet bloc began—and considers how the environment fit into these transformations there and across eastern Europe. Next, the chapter shifts to the GDR, demonstrating the environment’s position as a source of protest and then mutually agreed upon tenet of unification. Participation in that environmental decision-making was uneven, however, often minimizing earlier activists as West German influence waned. The spread of environmental consciousness destabilized communism, but capitalism and democracy introduced powerful new actors which diminished the old structures that had shaped the environmental movement in the 1980s.