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2 results

  • Chapter 7 - Analyticity

  • from Part II - Applications
  • Jamin Asay, The University of Hong Kong
  • Book:
    A Theory of Truthmaking
    Published online:
    18 April 2020
    Print publication:
    30 April 2020, pp 136-149

  • Summary

    A common account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is that while the former are true solely in virtue of meaning, the latter are true also in virtue of the way of the world. Quine famously disputed this characterization, and his skepticism over the analytic/synthetic distinction has cast a long shadow. Against this skepticism, it is argued that the common account comes close to the truth, and that truthmaker theory offers the resources for providing a compelling account of the distinction that preserves the basic ideas behind it, and avoids the standard criticisms (from Quine, Harman, and Boghossian) facing the distinction. The thesis is that we can formulate an analytic/synthetic distinction in terms of the distinction between truths that require no ontological accounting whatsoever versus those that do. The ontological accounting required for analytic truths is trivial – any set of books will suffice. What distinguishes the synthetic truths is that they require some form of substantive ontological accounting.

  • Chapter 12 - Naturalism, absolutism, relativism

  • Edited by Susana Nuccetelli, St Cloud State University, Minnesota, Gary Seay
  • Book:
    Ethical Naturalism
    Published online:
    05 January 2012
    Print publication:
    08 December 2011, pp 226-244

  • Summary

    This chapter clarifies the two views about morality. One of these is the view that basic moral demands apply only to some, not to everyone. Gilbert Harman calls this view as "moral relativism". The alternative to relativism is a view that Harman calls "moral absolutism". Moral absolutism is a version of moral rationalism, the view that basic moral demands are claims about the reasons that people have, where these claims are both necessary and a priori. The existence of moral demands does not require that everyone has sufficient reasons to do or hope or wish for the things that morality demands. Harman's hypothesis is that naturalism tells in favor of moral relativism. He argues that the relativist's conception of rationality or reasonableness is itself more naturalistically respectable than the absolutist's. This chapter presents four lines of reply to the flat-footed response to the Harman's argument.