According to Aristotle, character or ethos in tragedy is ’that which reveals what the moral choice is like’. This kind of ethos is what this book explores in Sophocles, by examining five tragedies in which moral choice is central to the course of the drama. These choices are made within the context of traditional Greek morality, which, amongst other things, expected one to help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies. Closely allied to these principles is the conception of justice as retaliation. This nexus of principles provides a pervasive ethical background to most of Greek literature and is of special significance for tragedy.

Greek popular thought is pervaded by the assumption that one should help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies. These fundamental principles surface continually from Homer onwards and survive well into the Roman period, and indeed to the present day, especially in international relations. They are firmly based on observation of human nature, which yields the conclusion that most human beings do in fact desire to help their friends and harm their enemies, and derive satisfaction from such behaviour. Thus Xenophon’s Socrates can count benefiting friends and defeating enemies as one of the things which bring the ’greatest pleasures’.

This chapter outlines Bayle’s mature vision of the best worldview that could be produced by a perfectly rational human mind, as advanced especially in some of the most famous articles in the Dictionnaire and in the Continuation des Pensées Diverses. It is shown that Bayle owed a huge debt to the Gassendi and his successors on this score, taking the most rational philosophy available to a pagan to be an atheistic monism in which the first principle was immanent in the world. Bayle’s sources were exactly those identified in I.3 as following Gassendi on this matter (Thomasius, Bernier, Parker), as well as the anti-Jesuit accounts of Chinese and Japanese religion. But for Bayle the philolosophico-theological payoff of this genealogical vision was not recourse to Gassendi’s own philosophy, but rather to Malebranche’s occasionalism, which for Bayle was the only possible ‘Christian philosophy’. This elaborate historicisation therefore allowed Bayle to make a natural-theological argument, which was deployed against Spinoza among others. But at the same time, Bayle also acknowledged the explanatory limits of Cartesian occasionalism, above all when it came to issues stemming from the incomprehensibility of mind-body interaction: the ‘place’ of immaterial substances and animal rationality. This position was neither scepticism nor fideism, but an argument about the practical limits of philosophy.

In this chapter, I continue to follow the manner in which Alfarabi describes the historical development of scientific awareness out of the murky depths of pre-scientific activity. Towards the peak of this development is the emergence and elaboration of the dialectical art, whose uses for science is Alfarabi's special concern in what follows. Dialectic is the method to the fundamental premises of all science. For instance, the Organon itself culminates in the Topics. Even if we regard the Posterior Analytics as the supreme analytical art, we cannot help but notice the way in which Aristotle carefully points out the ultimately hypothetical character of science (episteēmeē). Because of what may be described as the hypothetical character of scientific knowledge––that is, due to the fact that so much depends on the investigator's conviction regarding the truth of those first principles that provide the foundation of science––there will be those, according to Aristotle and Alfarabi, who deny the very possibility of scientific knowledge. The difficult problems that emerge over the status of scientific knowledge force us to confront the issue concerning the proper starting points (archai) or principles from which a syllogism proceeds but which are not reached by syllogism.