When Martin Heidegger famously rose in 1946 to pay tribute to Rainer Maria Rilke on the twentieth anniversary of the poet’s death, it was hardly by accident that he framed his interpretation of Rilke’s work by quoting Friedrich Hölderlin’s now canonical question (‘Wherefore poets…’) regarding the task of poetry in the time called the present, lines that also enabled Heidegger to voice his own distress at the state in which postwar Germany found itself and, more obliquely, the extent of his own involvement in the events of the previous decade and a half. During these postwar years, there were arguably few more attentive or perceptive readers of Heidegger’s writings on poetry than the French novelist, critic, and thinker Maurice Blanchot, whose own opposition to National Socialism was from the outset forceful and unyielding. This chapter examines Blanchot’s borrowings from Heidegger (as deployed in Blanchot’s account of the French poet Stéphane Mallarmé), his rigorous and probing criticisms of Heidegger’s thinking, and contrasts with that of Heidegger Blanchot’s own significantly divergent interpretation of the work of Hölderlin and Rilke.

This chapter is concerned with the way Hölderlin figures in Heidegger. It seeks to address the question of why Hölderlin is so significant for Heidegger. In order to answer this question, what has to be taken up is the way Heidegger constructs Hölderlin. Having examined that construction, what then has to be addressed is the question of another Hölderlin. The presence of this other Hölderlin on that distances Heidegger’s is examined in relation to the question of who the “us” is to whom poetry is directed.

This chapter addresses Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between philosophy and poetry, inasmuch as each mode of saying has its source in language. Heidegger’s use of poetry has been the object of considerable critical scrutiny; he has frequently been accused of forms of misuse. However, any assessment of what Heidegger understands himself to be doing with the poetic text requires a grasp of his understanding of the notion of use itself (and with this the notion of relation). From this perspective, we have a more founded approach to Heidegger’s manner of thinking with and by way of poetry.

The section’s closing chapter discusses the polemic between Classics and Romantics, which, despite local differences and its lack of traction in Britain, helped crystallise Romanticism in many countries both as a national and as a pan-European cultural phenomenon. Beginning with contradictory statements by Stendhal and Goethe, it argues that the Classic-Romantic nexus not only contributed to the meaning of ‘romantic’ but also of ‘classic’. The first did not replace the other, but instead complexified it by re-appropriating texts from antiquity. The chapter first shows how eighteenth-century philology informed discussions of modern culture in critical texts by F. Schlegel and Schiller, and in A.W. Schlegel’s lectures. These in turn informed Staël’s influential statements in De l’Allemagne and in her letter on translation, which fired up Romanticism in Italy, as well as Stendhal’s ‘Racine et Shakespeare’, which did the same in France. The author touches on the ideological role of translation, but also of Romantic philology and of philhellenism, showing how the Romantics in Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Poland, and Russia re-appropriated the classics. The chapter concludes with a more detailed discussion of Hölderlin’s Hyperion to show Romanticism’s reluctance to differentiate the classic from the modern.

Jacobi played a determinative role in shaping the landscape from which German Romanticism would emerge. His critique of the philosophies of both Spinoza and Fichte, and his advocacy of transcendent realism, would deeply influence Early German Romantics such as Schlegel, Novalis and Hölderlin and would go on to shape the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

The opening chapter looks at the role of judgement in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, focusing on the way in which the legislative function of the understanding is central to transcendental idealism. It shows how Kant associates determination with judgement, and how this association is maintained in Hölderlin and Schelling’s efforts to resolve certain aporias in the Kantian system, with being understood as indeterminate because it differs from the world of judgement. It concludes by showing how Hegel resolves difficulties presented by Hölderlin’s distinction between judgement and being by seeing judgement as an abstraction from a richer process of reason. As such, it demonstrates the centrality of judgement in the German Idealist tradition.

Our final chapter begins by returning to Hölderlin’s account of the relationship between being and judgement. It argues that central to Deleuze’s philosophy is the introduction of an account of determination that operates differently from the subject-predicate determination discovered in judgement. The chapter draws on Chapter 4’s account of depth to show how Deleuze takes up and then expands Merleau-Ponty’s account of our perspectival relationship to the world. It further develops Kant’s notions of transcendental illusion to show why we tend to misunderstand the nature of thinking and the transcendental ideas to illuminate Deleuze’s account of how thinking produces sense prior to the introduction of judging.

In the period 1770-1830 the progressive dissolution of the antithesis between religious inwardness and Enlightenment critique gave rise to historically unparalleled creativity in German literature and thought. This is also the age in which human subjectivity was decisively redefined by critical and then post-critical Idealism in German philosophy. Between 1770 and 1830 the twin heritages of rationalism in German Idealist philosophy and Pietism in the beginnings of modern biblical criticism came together. In so doing, both decisively affected the vocabulary of German literature and its function as a mode of cultural critique in late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Germany. The development in German writing from the literature of Empfindsamkeit (Sentimentality) and Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) to Romanticism reflects the evolution of a specifically literary idea of inwardness which variously expresses and challenges theological and political constructions of the subject.