This paper investigates the nexus between per capita income convergence and political institutions within the Eurozone. Employing data spanning the years 2002–2019, the research initially identifies multiple convergence clusters and subsequently examines the relationship between the creation of these clusters and different aspects of political institutions. The findings reveal that there are multiple steady states in the Eurozone, and their formation is notably influenced by political institutions alongside other conventional economic determinants derived from the Solow model. Furthermore, the study underscores that improvements in regulatory quality, as well as in aspects such as democracy, government effectiveness, and corruption control, positively impact income convergence across all member countries. These findings carry significant policy implications.

Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accurate and unbiased. But what if, in reality, estimates are highly inaccurate and biased? Then the assumption that cost-benefit analysis is a rational way to improve resource allocation would be a fallacy. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, we test the assumption that cost and benefit estimates of public investments are accurate and unbiased. We find this is not the case with overwhelming statistical significance. We document the extent of cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and forecasting bias in public investments. We further assess whether such inaccuracies seriously distort effective resource allocation, which is found to be the case. We explain our findings in behavioral terms and explore their policy implications. Finally, we conclude that cost-benefit analysis of public investments stands in need of reform and we outline four steps to such reform.

Applying benefit-cost analysis in the White House regulatory oversight process served as a basic mission of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) during its seven-year lifespan (1974–1981). This paper reviews that CWPS experience, which involved filing comments in over 300 proceedings at more than 25 federal regulatory agencies. The paper draws on those CWPS public comments (filings), identifying persistent and pervasive deficiencies in the economic analysis regulators then and now often use as support for new regulation. CWPS filings fostered greater acceptance of benefit-cost analysis in regulatory decisions; such analysis is now required by executive order.

The successes of the first decade of European Economic and Monetary Union are impressive, but it is fair to stress these were achieved in a relatively benign economic environment characterised by steady global growth, supportive financial conditions and fiscal windfalls associated with booms in asset markets. Although all this has come to an abrupt end with the financial crisis, there is a silver lining of fiscal stimulus being more effective in EMU than without the single currency, with offsetting exchange rate responses absent, trade multipliers stronger and the fiscal framework credible. But the financial crisis also clearly demonstrated the need for stronger coordination of national policy actions to internalise cross-border spillovers. Meanwhile, the European Commission has a major role to play in striking the right balance between short-term emergency measures and longer-term priorities. Against this backdrop, this article sheds light on the longer-run challenges and the policy agenda for meeting them.