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The chapter will cover one of the most critical and devastating issues in cyber abuse, namely cybercrime. The chapter will start by describing the different forms of cybercrime, such as cyber hacking, cyberattacks, phishing, insurance fraud, online consumer fraud, and more. The chapter will continue by presenting theories regarding the reasons behind the motivations that lead each Dark Tetrad personality to commit cybercrimes. The final section of the chapter will present findings about the relationship between each Dark Tetrad trait and the different forms of cybercrime.
Adaptation by
Adrian Evans, Monash University, Victoria,Richard Wu, The University of Hong Kong,Shenjian Xu, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing
Client confidentiality expresses the duty of loyalty to our clients, but our secrets are shrinking. Social media, hacking and surveillance are increasingly modern realities. Globally, concern about leaky ‘cloud’ storage, terrorism, corruption, organised crime and money laundering, as well as economic and trading challenges to state and public security, are reportable and create an environment in which lawyers cannot guarantee clients’ privacy. Nevertheless, professional secrecy remains important for lawyers to observe, because clients will not trust us if they think their affairs will be disclosed. We tabulate the confidentiality conduct rules across Greater China and analyze several scenarios according to the four frameworks of general morality. Deciding to keep a secret for good reasons can be a moral act that increases the stability of society. In the mainstream of cases where there are no state secrecy issues, lawyers need to re-legitimize support for client confidentiality because keeping secrets is still important to our communities, so that filial and personal relationships are respected and the common privacy we all need is retained.
This chapter analyses the policy and regulatory developments leading up to the enactment of the Cyber Security Law, including China’s Anti-Terrorism Law and how enforced source code ‘backdoor provisions’ were removed from the final draft of this law to protect China’s innovation policy goals. The discussion of China’s Network Sovereignty push is continued by explaining the significant debate about Network Sovereignty-related ideological thinking in China’s Anti-Terrorism Law. This law is yet another example of how problematic laws are delayed, as further consultation is sought. Comparisons are also made with a similar policy debate on ‘backdoor provisions’ in the United States, to show that the initial Chinese approach was not so different from universal debates, at that time, and ultimately reflects international practice. Similar approaches are now finding more widespread acceptance globally including in Australia and the United Kingdom.
This chapter outlines several ways that autonomous organizations will put pressure on existing law and will perhaps require accommodations from the law in the future. In particular, legal concepts like fraud that require “intent” may become less workable as more legal action is taken by systems that lack the capacity for intent. Moreover, if perpetually autonomous organizations become more commonplace, the law will need to pay attention to the possible drift between their initial operating agreements and future states of affairs, whether because of the possibility of “hacking” or simply because general circumstances have unexpectedly changed.
This chapter accepts that biomedicine is the dominant influence on our ideas about health and disease but considers what qualifications need to be introduced to do justice first to the more complicated issues to do with mental health and then to the very diverse conceptions that have been entertained in this area in non-Western societies, ancient and modern. Drawing on Hacking’s work on natural kinds and Luhrmann’s analysis of the uncertainties of modern psychiatry, it suggests further respects in which we need to exercise caution in assessing competing claims for expertise in this area.
translation across different natural languages and conceptual systems. While there is no totally neutral vocabulary in which this can be effected, this does not mean that mutual understanding is quite beyond reach, although that will depend on allowing for the revisability of some of the initial preconceptions in play. Comparing divergent schemata is indeed an important means of expanding the horizons of the history of science.
One of the more challenging intersections of law and technology is the use of computers and associated systems to commit criminal offences. While terminology varies, the neologism cybercrime is widely used to refer to a range of offending that involves computers as targets (eg hacking); as instruments (eg online fraud and forgery); or as incidental to the commission of a crime (eg using the internet to plan or organise a more conventional crime).1 As noted in Chapter 2, some cybercrimes are essentially the same as their ‘terrestrial’ counterparts, but adopt modern technology for their commission (ie ‘old wine in new bottles’), while others represent significantly newer forms of criminality. Examples of the former might include cyberstalking and online fraud, where the message is much the same but the means of communication is more efficient; while the latter might include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against websites.
The chapter introduces and explains some terms and concepts that are important for the understanding of the international legal questions with regard to transnational cybersecurity, such as hacking and software vulnerabilities, exploits, phishing, ransomware, or botnets. Furthermore, some basic categories like espionage, cybercrime, or cyberterrorism are laid out in order to distinguish the most prevalent forms of malicious behaviour in cyberspace and to conceptually prepare the subsequent focus on adversarial state conduct in cyberspace.
In this chapter, the author discusses the world of crypto-crime. Beginning with an account of the arrest of Alexander Vinnik, the Russian accused of running a money-laundering cryptocurrency exchange, the chapter goes on to describe the ways in which blockchain has allowed dramatic levels of criminality to spread throughout the industry.
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