We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
To ascertain soldiers’ potential status as wage labourers, this chapter discusses the process of initial enlistment and the ensuing terms of service, questioning especially whether soldiers enlisted of their own accord and retained their free status. It emerges that, from the reforms by Philip II of Macedonia onwards, political circumstances dictated a strong drift towards greater and at times complete reliance on so-called voluntary troops, who enlisted in exchange for pay. Thus, while the bulk of troops under Philip and Alexander were conscripts, these armies from the outset encouraged the enlistment of hired, voluntary troops in both elite and ordinary divisions. The lines between different troop types were blurred significantly under Alexander, whose conscript forces re-enlisted as hired men mid-way through his campaign. The Successors, whose often fickle claims to territory complicated the conscription of troops, were almost wholly reliant on voluntary troops. Accordingly, it is at this point that the epigraphic record attests military contracts, in which soldiers’ continued freedom of movement is guaranteed, alongside other terms of service. In the subsequent Hellenistic kingdoms, we see a return to conscription, especially in times of greatest need, alongside an enduring preference for professional, hired soldiers to man the standing armies.
Historians have voiced quite different opinions about the influence that the royal courts of the Hellenistic east had on the development of the Roman imperial court. This chapter considers this question, emphasizing the methodological challenges involved in identifying when one court has influenced another. After an outline of the major characteristics of the Hellenistic empires and the courts at their hearts, the focus is on the similarity of the problems faced by Hellenistic and Roman imperial leaders in the eastern Mediterranean, and on the two functions of the court that developed in response to this diversity: the court as a centre for the production of imperial, ‘cosmopolitan’ culture and as an instrument of elite integration. The chapter argues that Hellenistic influence on Roman court culture should be seen primarily in the Roman adoption of Hellenistic forms of court ritual and ideology.
Of the various Hellenistic kingdoms which arose out of the dissolution of Alexander the Great's dominions, and most resembled the empire conquered and for a time ruled over by the Macedonian king, was the Seleucid kingdom. This chapter discusses the geographical description, and military and naval aspects of the Seleucid Kingdom. The organization of the official cult of the sovereign can be useful for tracing the Seleucid administrative divisions. In considering the relations between the Seleucid kingdom and the Greek cities one must distinguish between the new Seleucid foundations and the 'old cities' which existed before the Seleucid period and even before that of Alexander and the Diadochi. The precise role of the Iranian regions and policies pursued there by the Seleucid sovereigns are less clear in comparison with the Persian empire, and the axis of the Seleucid kingdom was markedly further to the west. The achievement of Seleucid Syria is to be assessed historically as a posthumous contribution.
The pattern of the great Hellenistic kingdoms was fixed, under the three dynasties: the Ptolemaic, the Seleucid and the Antigonid, which were to preside over their destinies until their respective ends. Having narrowly escaped from the massacre of Ipsus, Demetrius Poliorcetes had hurled himself at Ephesus: he had to keep control of the sea. The occupation of the northern half of Macedonia in 288/7 expense of Demetrius, had further increased the importance of Lysimachus' state, and its ruler might well have seemed to have a chance of achieving what the Antigonids had attempted in vain, if not the re-establishment of Alexander's empire, at least a kingdom centred on the Aegean sea with all the coasts held by the same sovereign. The European Greek cities were broadly sympathetic to Lysimachus from hatred of the Antigonids, since Gonatas still held Corinth, Piraeus, Chalcis and some other towns, mainly in the Peloponnese.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.