Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 3 - The Prover–Skeptic Dialogues

  • from Part I - The Philosophy of Deduction
  • Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
  • Book:
    The Dialogical Roots of Deduction
    Published online:
    10 December 2020
    Print publication:
    17 December 2020, pp 37-60

  • Summary

    This chapter critically discusses the prominent dialogical accounts of logic and deduction proposed by Lorenzen, Hintikka, and Lakatos. It is argued that, while they contain valuable insights, Lorenzen’s dialogical logic and Hintikka’s game-theoretical semantics ultimately both fail to provide a satisfactory philosophical account of logic and deduction in dialogical terms. This critical evaluation then leads to a precise formulation of the dialogical model defended in the book, the Prover–Skeptic model, which is by and large inspired by Lakatos’ ‘proofs and refutations’ model, but with some important modifications.