Forgetting history, which frequently repeats itself, is a mistake. In General Psychopathology, Jaspers criticised early 20th century psychiatrists, including those who thought psychiatry was only neurology (Wernicke) or only abnormal psychology (Freud), or who did not see the limitations of the medical model in psychiatry (Kraepelin). Jaspers proposed that some psychiatric disorders follow the medical model (Group I), while others are variations of normality (Group III), or comprise schizophrenia and severe mood disorders (Group II). In the early 21st century, the players’ names have changed but the game remains the same. The US NIMH is reprising both Wernicke’s brain mythology and Kraepelin’s marketing promises. The neo-Kraepelinian revolution started at Washington University, became pre-eminent through the DSM-III developed by Spitzer, but reached a dead end with the DSM-5. McHugh, who described four perspectives in psychiatry, is the leading contemporary representative of the Jaspersian diagnostic approach. Other neo-Jaspersians are: Berrios, Wiggins and Schwartz, Ghaemi, Stanghellini, Parnas and Sass. Can psychiatry learn from its mistakes? The current psychiatric language, organised at its three levels, symptoms, syndromes, and disorders, was developed in the 19th century but is obsolete for the 21st century. Scientific advances in Jaspers’ Group III disorders require collaborating with researchers in the social and psychological sciences. Jaspers’ Group II disorders, redefined by the author as schizophrenia, catatonic syndromes, and severe mood disorders, are the core of psychiatry. Scientific advancement in them is not easy because we are not sure how to delineate between and within them correctly.

Fifty years ago, on July 13, 1955, Professor John Dunne delivered his presidential address to the annual meeting of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association in Dublin, focussing on the contributions of ‘the physical sciences to psychological medicine.’ In his address, Professor Dunne discussed (a) the principle of conditioning, and the work of Hans Selye, especially in relation to ‘General Adaptation Syndrome’ and the role of stress in producing psychosomatic symptoms; (b) cybernetics and the generation of partial models of cerebral functioning, such as Grey Walter's Conditioned Reflex Analogue and the Electronic Delayed Storage Automatic Computer of Cambridge and (c) the development of integrated, holistic models of cerebral functioning, that took account of advances in both physical medicine and psychoanalytic thought. Professor Dunne placed particular emphasis on the importance of basic scientific research and the development of broadly based models of psychiatric care, both of which were to play critical roles in the development of more scientifically-based, bio-psycho-social models of service provision in the decades to follow.