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Military historians have traditionally depicted the Ottoman’s second siege of Habsburg Vienna and the disastrous, ‘Great Turkish War’ that followed (1683–99) as a decisive victory that saved Europe and triggered Ottoman decline. But what gets lost in this historiography is the extent to which the war profoundly altered the confessional and ethnic make-up of the Ottoman army. The recurring defection of Ottoman Orthodox Christian warrior populations like the Serbs to rival armies, followed by Muslim retribution against them, constituted a sea-change in the nature of Ottoman imperial sovereignty and social relations on the ground. Not only would Istanbul henceforth bar Christian warriors from serving in the army; it was forced to outsource imperial governance and defence to pastoral Muslim warrior populations like Albanians on unprecedented levels. The Ottoman state, however, lacked both the resources and the will to pay and offer them sufficient access to status and power, which meant that these new agents of empire were difficult to control. This chapter sketches the nature and repertoire of violence and crime stemming from Istanbul’s massive privatisation of military and policing powers and its deleterious impact on inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations in Ottoman society.
Politics and organized religion are each branches of the persuasive arts. With the invention of the press, the printed word was immediately seized upon by the Church as a rapid and effective means of disseminating doctrine, and seeking support and money. The first monarch to make regular use of printed propaganda, was Henry VII. The papal dispensation allowing his marriage to Elizabeth of York on 18 March 1486 was printed in an English translation by William de Machlinia. The Ordenaunces of warre, printed in May 1492, is the first extant printed document to bear the royal arms. The political agenda during 1512-13 effectively made the press an extremely useful and controllable mechanism of government. Probably at the end of 1512, the impressor regius printed a charter of a bull of Julius II which announced the formation of the Holy League, declared Louis XII an enemy of the Church, and absolved his subjects from allegiance to their monarch.
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