This chapter makes a general argument, equally applicable (mutatis mutandis) to the IOM as to the World Bank, or the World Health Organization or even the European University Institute. While it is arguable that the IOM has no strong humanitarian mission, this circumstance alone is unlikely to affect its legal accountability – the problems with accountability of international organizations under international law go much, much deeper. Legal accountability (not quite a term of art perhaps) is conceptualized as utilizing a (more or less) legal mechanism to test the acts of an international organizations against (more or less) legal standards. This may be done before a court, but may also involve internal accountability mechanisms. Those standards, in turn, do not simply comprise the entire corpus of international law, but are limited, it is generally agreed, to the treaties that international organizations are parties to, to international legal rules that have become internalized, and to the ‘general rules of international law’. There is consensus that this is an authoritative enumeration, but precious little agreement on what this entails

This chapter assesses the impact of the 2013 UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and the 2016 IOM-UN agreement on the IOM’s relationship to human rights protection. In doing so, it contextualizes the ongoing debate of the organization’s normative framework, (controversial) human rights practices and relationship to the UN. The authors argue that by signing the 2016 UN-IOM agreement, the IOM is indirectly bound by the principles underlying the HRDDP as far as it cannot act against its core norms. At the same time, the article argues that given the policy’s limitations, one should not put too much hope into the applicability of the HRDDDP to the IOM. This is because it only aims at preventing “grave violations” of human rights in specific contexts. Therefore, the chapter concludes with some suggestions on how the HRDDP could be reformed in light of the IOM’s new relation with the UN to protect human rights more effectively.

Chapter 6 examines the Assistance to Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme run by the IOM. I argue that the AVRR elusively expands the deportation capacity of countries of ‘transit’. I label the function played by aid as elusive because the AVRR is not coercively imposed by the IOM or European states on Moroccan authorities, countries of origin, or migrants. Moroccan authorities consider it a cheaper and more diplomatically acceptable alternative to deportations. Embassies of countries of origin see it as an economically advantageous way to outsource assistance to their citizens abroad in distress. Migrants themselves see it as a last resort opportunity in case things go wrong in Morocco – or so argue IOM officers.

Intergovernmental organizations like the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have become key actors and facilitators between European states and countries of origin or transit, but it is unclear to what extent these organizations are able to influence the domestic policies of host countries. Chapter 7 finds that in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey there are certain limitations that intergovernmental organizations face in attempting to carry out their agendas or advocate for alternative policies, but there are also areas in which intergovernmental organizations have been successful in either influencing domestic policy or having a host government adopt a certain agenda. While the financial incentives that intergovernmental organizations can offer host states sometimes allows for greater influence, other factors are also critical, including: (1) whether the issue of migration or refugees has gained domestic political salience leading to further red-lines; (2) the pre-existing relationships that intergovernmental or international organizations have in the host state; (3) the security concerns around migration or refugees.