This chapter examines belief in misinformation during the Coalition air war against ISIL in Iraq. In particular, it investigates a unique nationwide survey of contemporary Iraq that measures Iraqis’ factual perceptions about the Coalition airstrikes against ISIL, as well as whether they have lived under ISIL rule where the vast majority of strikes actually occurred. Moreover, this survey is paired with geo-located event data on the Coalition airstrikes themselves obtained from Airwars in order to measure the respondents’ proximity to the events more directly. Overall, the results reveal that Iraqis’ factual misperceptions about Coalition actions are widespread – fueled by both their own preexisting political orientations and streams of information in the dispute – but that civilians with greater personal exposure to the campaign are much less likely to embrace these falsehoods. Indeed, both experience living under ISIL control and proximity to the airstrikes themselves significantly reduce factual misperceptions about the Coalition’s aerial campaign, including false claims about its targeting of Shiʿa Arab-led militias and its strategic benefits to ISIL.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the third phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria. First, the chapter considers the Anglosphere response to the rise of Islamic State, as the Anbar Campaign saw the group seize territory in northern Iraq. Second, it analyses the re-working of discourses of the War on Terror to articulate and frame the new threat for Anglosphere audiences. Third, it explores the discursive war of position that structured foreign policy debates in the USA, UK and Australia. The chapter explores how, despite some resistance, the Anglosphere rallied against the new threat in contrast to the Syrian Civil War’s first two phases.

Considers the strong realism of Obama and how his efforts to avoid the Syrian Civil War were like those of George H. W. Bush in Yugoslavia. Examines pros and cons of his nuclear deal with Iran and his failure to contain Russian power in Ukraine and Syria, an impotence he shares with several of his Cold War and post–Cold War predecessors. Assesses the Obama foreign policy legacy and how far it explains the rise of Donald Trump.