In collective pension arrangements without a sponsor guarantee, assets and liabilities are commingled, and members' benefits are adjusted to reflect emerging plan experience. Stakeholders pay attention to the fairness of the intergenerational transactions arising from the inclusion of certain design elements; however, implicit intergenerational transactions exist even in pure collective defined contribution (CDC) arrangements without any such explicit stabilization mechanisms. In this study, we find that the implicit risk transactions are uneven: significant value transfers among cohorts can result from joining a pure CDC plan. We then compare these to the additional value transfers arising from explicit stabilization mechanisms.

When the financial positions of pension funds worsen, regulations prescribe that pension funds reduce the gap between their assets (invested contributions) and their liabilities (accumulated pension promises). This paper quantifies the business cycle effects and distributional implications of various types of restoration policies. We extend a canonical New-Keynesian model with a tractable demographic structure and, as a novelty, a flexible pension fund framework. Fund participants accumulate inflation-indexed or non-indexed benefits and funding adequacy is restored by revaluing previously accumulated pension wealth (Defined Contribution (DC)) or changing the pension fund contribution rate on labor income (Defined Benefit (DB)). Economies with DC pension funds respond similarly to adverse capital quality shocks as economies without pension funds. DB pension funds, however, distort labor supply decisions and exacerbate economic fluctuations. While DB pension funds achieve intergenerational risk-sharing, welfare analyses indicate that the negative effects of the induced distortions are sizeable.

We explore the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing through both private funded pensions and via the public debt. We use a multi-period overlapping generation model with a pay-as-you-go pension pillar, a funded pension pillar and a government. Shocks are smoothed via the public debt and variations in the indexation of pension entitlements and pension contributions. The intensity of these adjustments increases when the pension funding ratio or public debt gets closer to their boundaries. The best-performing pension arrangement is a hybrid funded scheme in which both contributions and entitlement indexation are simultaneously deployed as stabilisation instruments. We find that contribution and indexation adjustment policies are substitutes and the same is the case for contribution and tax adjustment policies. By contrast, indexation and tax adjustment policies are complements. We compare different taxation regimes and conclude that a regime in which pension benefits are taxed, while contributions are paid before taxes, is preferred to a regime in which contributions are paid after taxes, but benefits are untaxed.