Motivated by the increased importance of trade between industrialized and less-developed countries, we build a two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring inter-industry trade as well as intra-industry trade to analyze the business cycle dynamics of industrialized countries. We find that import-competing sectors are more sensitive to domestic productivity shocks than exporting sectors, due to their stronger reliance on domestic demand. This generates pressure to adjust relative prices and to reallocate factors of production. It also propagates the international spillover effects of productivity shocks leading to stronger business cycle comovement across countries, relative to a traditional business cycle model that does not feature inter-industry trade.

US output is more strongly correlated with the output of energy-exporting countries than with that of energy-importing countries. I first document this empirical finding, then construct a three-country model in which countries’ different energy production and trade structures are considered. The three countries are the USA (an energy importer), a non-US energy importer, and an energy exporter. Consistent with the empirical findings, the model produces a higher output correlation between the USA and the energy exporter than between the USA and the energy importer. A positive productivity shock in the USA, raising its output, leads to increases in energy prices and its import demand for energy. The increased energy prices adversely influence output in the energy importer, whereas the rise in US energy imports has positive effects on output in the energy exporter, enabling the correlation of US output with the exporter’s output to be higher.

The literature on international business cycles has employed dynamic factor models (DFMs) to disentangle global from group-specific and national factors in countries’ macroeconomic aggregates. Therefore, the countries have simply been classified ex ante as belonging to the same region or the same level of development. This paper estimates a DFM for a sample of 106 countries and three variables (output, consumption, investment) over the period 1960–2014, in which the countries are classified according to the outcome of a cluster analysis. By comparing the results with those obtained by the previous grouping approaches, we show substantial deviations in the importance of global and group-specific factors. Remarkably, when the groups are defined properly, the “global business cycle” accounts for only a very small fraction of macroeconomic fluctuations, most evidently in the industrialized world. The group-specific factors, on the other hand, play a much greater role for national business cycles than previously thought—also in the pre-globalization period.

We add agency costs into a two-country, two-good international business-cycle model. In our model, changes in the relative price of investment arise endogenously. Despite the fact that technology shocks are uncorrelated across countries, the relative price of investment is positively correlated across countries in our model, much as it is in detrended U.S./Euro-area data. We also find that financial frictions tend to increase the volatility of the terms of trade and the international correlations of consumption, hours worked, output, and investment. We then compare this model to an alternative model that also includes risk shocks. We use credit spread data (for the United States) to calibrate the AR(1) process for risk shocks. We find that risk shocks are too small to significantly impact the model's dynamics.

This paper investigates the effects of introducing imperfect competition in an international business-cycle model. We provide some international evidence on markups and analyze the implications of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition for the effects and the international transmission of technology and government spending shocks. We also consider exogenous markup fluctuations as a source of shocks and of transmission of business cycles. We show that imperfect competition improves the behavior of a standard model driven by technology shocks, although the behavior of foreign trade variables remains unexplained. We also show that an imperfectly competitive model driven by government shocks can explain the international business cycle at least as well as a model driven by technology shocks.