An important field of the political economy literature examines the mechanism of property rights commitments in authoritarian regimes where formal political constraints are absent. While many of the existing studies focus on how domestic autocratic institutions shape the formation of property rights regimes, this paper takes an open-economy approach and examines the compound effect of global economic integration and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on property rights protection in authoritarian regimes. We propose that the domestic presence of foreign factors of production is positively associated with more credible property rights commitments in authoritarian economies. Moreover, this association is moderated by authoritarian regimes' participation in institutionalized IGOs, which enhance the organizational capacity of these foreign owners of production factors. Through the transnational networks of production integration, international institutions indirectly alter the domestic distribution of bargaining power between the authoritarian government and private economic actors, rendering the commitment to property rights protection more credible. An analysis of a panel dataset consisting of 105 authoritarian regimes yields preliminary evidence supporting our proposition.

The first wave of globalization, from 1850 to 1914, is considered to be a period when global trade and investment increased at a steady pace, impacting on global economic growth. Yet that evolution was not consistent across all industries. This article explains why, during that period, global trade in wines and other alcoholic beverages was reversed. Apart from diseases that affected vineyards in the main wine-producing countries of the Old World, various factors in the New World—including local government incentives and the presence of consumers (immigrants) with acquired habits of consumption from European countries—created strong incentives for the imitation and adulteration of wines. This study looks at the strategies used both by the imitators in expanding their businesses and by the innovators to survive in institutional environments that were weak with regard to the protection of their intellectual property.