How should the United States end the war with Japan? Secretary of War Stimson agonized over the use of the atomic bomb, knowing it would kill tens of thousands of innocent civilians. But he also recoiled at the thought of an invasion of Japan, which would likely cost many Allied soldiers’ lives. There had to be an alternative. He found a third option in conditional surrender: allowing the Japanese to retain their Emperor. If Japan’s leaders could be assured that the Emperor could remain on his throne safe from prosecution, then perhaps they might be induced to surrender. This chapter tracks the convoluted course by which high officials tried to maneuver President Truman toward conditional surrender and away from the other two costly options.

Eleanor Roosevelt has long been seen as the conscience of the nation, but too little attention has focused on her support of the Japanese-American internment. Caught in the impossible position of opposing internment yet needing to support her husband’s policy, Mrs. Roosevelt publicly backed the plan. When we listen back to her speeches and read her writings at the time, we find a person trying her best to ameliorate the worst aspects of the government’s actions, but simultaneously revealing far less public concern for the victims than we might have imagined.Mrs. Roosevelt’s morally muddled actions contrasted with those of Assistant War Secretary John McCloy. The chapter examines McCloy’s extensive knowledge of German sabotage and how this effected his perception of the Japanese-American threat.

The final chapter asks what became of the men and women who played vital parts in America’s struggles between vengeance and virtue. It asks whether any of these leaders regretted their actions, which actions, and why.