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Chapter 6 examines Rousseau's claim that human societies are artificial and that recognizing this is crucial to understanding how theories of social pathology can ascribe non-arbitrary standards of healthy functioning to institutions. The most important sense in which society is made by us is expressed in the claim that institutions are grounded in conventions. The upshot of this claim is that a kind of self-consciousness is intrinsic to social life, namely, collective acceptance of the authority of the rules governing social institutions, which, in the most fundamental institutions, includes a shared conception of the good that explains their "point," part of which consists in promoting the freedom of social members. Because acting in accordance with such a conception is constitutive of activity in institutional life, the functions of institutions – including a conception of their healthy functioning – are accessible, if imperfectly, to the agents on whose activity those functions depend.
This chapter assesses the merits of Aquinas’s hylomorphic account of the human act by comparing it to three contemporary action theories: (1) Donald Davidson’s causal theory of action, (2) Jennifer Hornsby’s agent-causal account, and (3) John Searle’s component analysis. It argues that Aquinas’s account has several advantages over these theories. First, it does not fall prey to the problem of deviant causal chains, which besets Davidson’s theory. Nor does it fall victim to the problem of the disappearing agent, which besets Davidson’s as well as Searle’s theory. Finally, Aquinas’s theory also has an advantage over Hornsby’s account. On Hornsby’s picture, a bodily human act is a causing that occurs inside the body, which has the counterintuitive consequence that human acts are unobservable, on her view. The chapter argues that for Aquinas only one component of a bodily human act is unobservable, namely, the volition, while the bodily commanded act is open to our gaze. Despite these advantages, it argues that Aquinas’s theory also has a drawback, namely, the dualism on which it is predicated. But it suggests that his hylomorphic theory of the human act can be detached from his dualism.
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