This chapter examines the current situation concerning the codification, recognition, and implementation of corporate responsibility both in and outside the IIA regime, focusing on environmental and human rights responsibilities. It first discusses certain challenges in regulating and pursuing the responsibility of TNCs’ conduct in domestic legal orders. It proceeds to note a general lack of international mechanisms for holding TNCs responsible for their conduct, through the examination of: (a) the paucity of international law that provides binding obligations of juridical persons as well as a lack of enforcement mechanisms; (b) the attempts towards establishing binding international human rights obligations for corporations; and (c) the development of ‘soft-law’ instruments to advance the concept of corporate responsibility. The chapter then examines the recognition of investor responsibility in the text of IIAs and model IIAs by referencing a dataset of 1,000 randomly selected IIAs and model IIAs to confirm that incorporating the concept of investor responsibility into IIAs remains an exceptional practice.

This chapter investigates judicial corruption by illuminating the contrast between the high expectations generated by the construction of strong courts via ambitious reform efforts, and the reality of pervasive corruption within those same judicial institutions, especially where political power is concentrated. It examines the case of Ecuador, where a Constitutional Court with very broad formal powers granted by the 2008 Constitution was at one point in its history the site of corrupt exchanges between judges, lawyers and politicians. Crucially, such exchanges thrived when political power was concentrated: politicians demanded favourable decisions on specific issues and in exchange offered credible protection for judges seeking to engage in corrupt dealings with high-flying private litigants.

This Chapter will show that this structured model of proportionality does not exist in the Indonesian constitutional realm, even though the term proportionality has been formally used by the Constitutional Court since 2010.While there is a textual basis under the Indonesian Constitution for constitutional rights to be balanced with other important interests – Article 28J (2) of the 1945 Constitution – the Indonesian Constitutional Court has used Article 28J (2) instead as an interpretative tool to limit or ignore the bill of rights. The Court’s jurisprudence to date suggests that the Court considers Article 28J (2) as a “trump card” to override constitutional rights. This Chapter further argues that the principle of proportionality has never flourished in Indonesian soil because of the lack of intellectual leadership in the Constitutional Court. The majority of the Constitutional Court Justices are not well versed with the notion of proportionality, and the Indonesian legal academia has also failed to generate a robust discussion on the principle of proportionality.