The main focus and argument of this chapter is that the Kurdish movement in this period experienced the emergence of several new tendencies that distinguish this era from the previous period (the 1960s). The trends and tendencies which occurred through this era allow us to classify this period as an era of diversification and thickening of the numbers and the spectrum of ideologies of the actors and organisations that participated in this period’s movement. The most eye-catching trend is related to Komala’s announcement of its official activity and its focus on the class problematic in Kurdistan. In line with Komala’s emergence as a new actor within the Kurdish movement, different examples of challenge and difficulties occurred in the relation between this organisation and the KDPI, which resulted in half a decade of war between these major organisations of the Iranian Kurdish movement. These factors and their impact on the post-revolutionary Kurdish movement are discussed in this chapter.

This chapter investigates the socio-political and ideological aspects of an event named in the lexicon of the Iranian Kurdish movement as the Kurdish Peasant Uprising of 1952-3 (Rapêr̄ini Werzeran u Cûtyarani Kurdistan 1331-2). This event took place in a period when kurdayêti was the only ideological force behind mobilising the Kurdish people to conduct collective political action. However, throughout this chapter I argue that this uprising highlighted the issue of class conflict in the rural areas of Kurdistan, and challenged the authority of the Kurdish feudal class. In addition, the KDPI’s role, as the only and major ethnonationalist political organisation is assessed and discussed. Due to the way this uprising was conducted, it has been argued to be the first collective class-inspired rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan.

This chapter investigates the socio-political and ideological aspects of an event named in the lexicon of the Iranian Kurdish movement as the Kurdish Peasant Uprising of 1952-3 (Rapêr̄ini Werzeran u Cûtyarani Kurdistan 1331-2). This event took place in a period when kurdayêti was the only ideological force behind mobilising the Kurdish people to conduct collective political action. However, throughout this chapter I argue that this uprising highlighted the issue of class conflict in the rural areas of Kurdistan, and challenged the authority of the Kurdish feudal class. In addition, the KDPI’s role, as the only and major ethnonationalist political organisation is assessed and discussed. Due to the way this uprising was conducted, it has been argued to be the first collective class-inspired rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan.

The main focus and argument of this chapter is that the Kurdish movement in this period experienced the emergence of several new tendencies that distinguish this era from the previous period (the 1960s). The trends and tendencies which occurred through this era allow us to classify this period as an era of diversification and thickening of the numbers and the spectrum of ideologies of the actors and organisations that participated in this period’s movement. The most eye-catching trend is related to Komala’s announcement of its official activity and its focus on the class problematic in Kurdistan. In line with Komala’s emergence as a new actor within the Kurdish movement, different examples of challenge and difficulties occurred in the relation between this organisation and the KDPI, which resulted in half a decade of war between these major organisations of the Iranian Kurdish movement. These factors and their impact on the post-revolutionary Kurdish movement are discussed in this chapter.

“This chapter focuses on the political developments in the Kurdish regions of the Middle East during the 1970s, which was a pivotal period for the Kurds in a number of respects. The defeat of Kurdish armed struggle there in March 1975 marked the beginning of the fragmentation of the Iraqi Kurdish movement. In this period, Kurdish conflicts in the region became integrated into the regional power struggles and created the possibility of alliances, but as the experience of the Kurdish movement in Iraq demonstrated, the Kurds could not rely on these alliances as the empowerment of the Kurds was not the objective. In Turkey, after years of silence, Kurdish activists began organizing cultural and political activities and challenged Kurds’ oppression and denial of their identity. In Iran, too, the Kurdish movement was highly active and after the overthrow of the shah’s regime, it mobilized a significant section of Kurdish society around the demand of territorial autonomy. In Syria, despite the existence of Kurdish political organization, the consolidation of the authoritarian regime in Syria following Hafez al-Assad’s ascendency to power further limited the opportunities for Syria’s Kurdish movement.”