This paper considers some of the issues relating to Christian ministry in a cultural world that thinks of itself as post-religious. It builds upon some ideas of Simone Weil on forms of the implicit love of God (with particular attention to beauty and music), Karl Rahner's anthropology and the Christian doctrine of the creational relationship. It discusses the way Rousseau's bifurcation of religion into personal religiosity and a public civil religion is a template that the modern world seems to favour, making it difficult for Christian religion to find a place in liberal cultures of rights and tolerance. It ends by exploring Marilynne Robinson's suggestion that ‘people live profound lives’ and suggests that the virtues of hope and love might be signs of serious living in the absence of explicit religious belief.

This article introduces the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy to theologians by placing him in critical dialogue with Karl Rahner. It examines how Nancy's deconstruction of Christianity accuses Western reason, including Christianity, of forgetting the body and supporting an ethos of disembodiment. Nancy proposes a new opening of reason (déclosion, “dis-closure”) and a corresponding praxis (“adoration”). This reason and praxis involve an exit from Christianity. Rahnerian essays on matter, spirit, and sacramentality demonstrate that while Christianity has, historically, fallen prey to the pathologies Nancy identifies, it also has thought in terms of something like dis-closed reason and has practiced something like “adoration.” While Nancy's insistence on the need for an exit from Christianity is not necessarily well posed, his deconstruction of Christianity can help Christian theologians as they develop thinking that supports an ethos sensitive to the body—or that keeps the body's sense open.

The sacrament of order raises important ecumenical questions, but discussion is hindered by binding historical magisterial judgments of invalidity. This article examines a mostly overlooked ecumenical proposal made by Karl Rahner in 1974 for approaching the sacrament and examines its implications by applying the insights of contemporary cognitive linguistic thinkers. Rahner suggested that Protestant order could be ruled valid by the Catholic Church through a determination analogous to the radical sanation of a marriage. Such a proposal both accepts the prior judgment that the sacrament was invalid and declares it to now be valid retroactively to its beginning. Rahner's proposal has several important implications: first, it can allow for mutual recognition of ministries without requiring either a reordination of the other's presbyters or a revocation of the historical judgments of invalidity. Potentially more broadly, it can serve as the basis for a rethinking of sacramental causality in general.

In this essay, the author reflects on the personal experience of the loss of his spouse, a reflection inspired and informed by the faith and theology of Karl Rahner. With death, it is not that a “new” time has begun, but that time itself has ended. And yet that mutual love as spouses continues. Life following the death of a spouse presents itself as an empty nothingness. But God, incomprehensible mystery, is our beginning. Our lives are filled with rupture and discontinuity not as evidence of a missing or absent God, but that we are not God.

In this article I argue that Rahner's notion of the Supernatural Existential serves to complement and more concretely illustrate Taylor's at-times tacit, if conflicted, advocacy for some sort of human characteristic that seeks, desires, or is otherwise oriented toward something ‘beyond human flourishing.' By engaging Rahner's theological anthropology with Taylor's thought in ‘A Secular Age,' I show how Taylor's immanent and transcendent divide presupposes an overly cognitive framework that relies extensively on human agency, thematic reflection, and the necessary intellectualization of human experience. As such, Taylor only ever engages in a secondary-level or a posteriori reflection on belief and unbelief, thereby (perhaps unwittingly) precluding the possibility of considering the a priori ‘condition' for his proposed ‘conditions for belief or unbelief,' otherwise known as ‘secularity 3.' In uncovering the secondary-level cognitive conditions for categorical belief and unbelief today, helps shed new light on the relevance and value of Rahner's project. Furthermore, I suggest that both Rahner and Taylor, although maybe not immediately recognizable, actually share similar concerns that initially launched their respective projects. Read together, Rahner and Taylor offer a fuller treatment of both the human condition and the social circumstances of this age.

A theology of infertility is needed to help couples and the broader ecclesial community understand the theological implications of infertility. Infertility raises questions about human freedom, finitude, embodiment, childlessness, and parenthood. In this article, dominant cultural assumptions surrounding each of these areas when considering reproductive technologies are sketched. Official Roman Catholic teaching on reproductive technologies (Donum Vitae), while rejecting most forms of such technologies, does provide a viable response to the presupposition that reproductive technologies resolve infertility. Given the dominant cultural assumptions and insights from Roman Catholic teaching, this article advocates for several ecclesial changes when considering infertility. Finally, theological resources for developing a theology of infertility are offered. Specifically, insights from Karl Rahner's theology of concupiscence are examined with an eye toward how they provide a framework for rethinking the cultural assumptions about freedom and finitude when considering reproductive technologies.

In this article, I argue that at the root of the ‘ontological’ argument lies the notion that the idea of God is truth: in the idea of God, the meaning of the concept and the reality of the Being actually converge; the idea of God is God. After looking at a number of thinkers whose philosophical method is reminiscent of Anselm's I conclude that, while Anselm did not furnish a conclusive proof of the necessary existence of God, his argument shows how the question of the existence of God is one and the same with the question of the intelligibility and coherence of God and with the question of the intelligibility and coherence of reality.

This paper addresses two questions concerning the attribution of mystery to God. First, if Christianity is neither rationalistic nor agnostic concerning the knowledge of God, then what is the proper understanding of mystery when it is attributed to God? Second, if mystery conditions all theological thinking, how can the proper understanding of mystery be applied systematically across the full range of theological reflection? The response to the first question has three parts. First, God is incomprehensible not because we do not have access to God. God communicates God's self and we can know God's essence but we cannot comprehend God. Second, Thomas Aquinas shows us how we can know God yet God remains incomprehensible. Third, I elucidate the analogy of proper proportionality in arguing that although we do not fully know what we are talking about when we speak of God our concepts are not meaningless. In responding to the second question, I argue, in response to Karl Rahner's use of mystery in his treatment of the problem of suffering, that God's power cannot be absolute but must be related to God's goodness if one is to preserve the mystery of God across the full range of theological reflection.