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This chapter argues that the adoption of the leniency programme in Korea is proof of considering any kind of price-fixing agreements as the supreme evil in society. Since its adoption, the leniency programme has contributed to nearly 55 per cent of all detected cartels. The leniency programme is attractive in its conceptualisation, because of high rewards for a limited number of firms and its conditions that are transparent and predictable. Furthermore, the chapter argues that private actions and criminal sanctions are not necessarily detrimental to a leniency application in Korea. Both are very rare and, in the case of criminal sanctions, there is a court judgment that leniency applicants should be excluded from the indictment. To further improve the leniency programme, the chapter suggests weakening the ineligibility of recidivists to apply for leniency and introducing penalty plus, whereby the sanction increases if a firm refrains from disclosing participation in another cartel, and an omnibus question, whereby a leniency applicant is asked to report information on other forbidden practices it is aware of.
Competition law is a significant legal transplant in East Asia, where it has come into contact with deeply rooted variants of Confucian culture. This timely volume analyses cultural factors in mainland China, Japan and Korea, focusing on their shared but diversely evolved Confucian heritage. These factors distinguish the competition law systems of these countries from those of major western jurisdictions, in terms of the goals served by the law, the way enforcement is structured, and the way subjects of the law respond to it. Concepts from cultural studies inform a new and eclectic perspective on these dynamics, with the authors also drawing on ideas from law and economics, comparative law, East Asian studies, political science, business management and ethics, and institutional economics. The volume presents a model for cultural analysis of comparative legal topics and contributes to a greater understanding of the challenges to deeper convergence of competition laws between East and West.
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