This chapter demostrates that the ambiguities of wartime neutrality in Macau continued to haunt China’s relations with Portugal in the post-war years. Five interconnected issues relating to Portuguese neutrality evidence China’s post-war quest for justice and recognition: the re-establishment of regular diplomatic contacts, the handling of Japanese property, the extradition of suspects of war crimes and collaboration, the abolition of extraterritoriality and critiques of neutrality in calls to return Macau to Chinese rule. These issues raised questions about the meaning of justice and the legitimacy of who got to wield it. In its relations with a small and relatively weak European colonial power, China sought to affirm its new post-war international status. However, this process was constrained by resistance to the Nationalists’ anti-imperialist goals in South China and by the changing fortunes of Nationalist power as the Chinese Civil War unfolded.

This chapter addresses Macau’s place in China’s war with Japan from the early 1930s to 1941. Macau featured in Chinese resistance efforts from the start, but its relevance became more pronounced after 1937, especially after Guangdong province was engulfed in the conflict. The chapter argues that, due to its neutrality, Macau became an important meeting place for competing Chinese actors. Both those engaged in Chinese resistance – Nationalists, communists and others – and collaborators with Japan (before and after the consolidation of Wang Jingwei’s Reorganised National Government) used the enclave to circulate materials and propaganda, to mobilise others for their cause and to reach out to opponents.

Chapter 3 analyzes how the Kuomintang (KMT) significantly reformed itself, including by bringing corruption under control, after its loss of the Chinese mainland and retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Corruption was rampant in China under KMT rule, despite intermittent efforts at reform, and contributed to the Nationalist regime’s delegitimization and defeat in the Chinese Civil War. Yet, soon after arriving in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek led the party in a major restructuring and cleanup, the KMT Reconstruction (1950–52), that curbed organizational dysfunction and corruption and essentially re-founded the regime. I argue that this reform was successful because, while the motivation to reduce corruption had already existed at the top, only after the KMT’s challenging postwar transition did the winning combination of motivation, discretionary power, and state capacity come together. In addition, this chapter analyzes Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership of the Governmental Rejuvenation (1969–72), which among other things helped reverse a rising trend of bureaucratic corruption. Corruption would only become widespread again in Taiwan after the onset of democratization in the late 1980s.

Even before arriving in Hong Kong from Moscow, Ho Chi Minh had prior experience in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou, having set up there in November 1924 (one year after Tan Malaka). The period coincides with the First United Front between Kuomintang government under Sun Yat-sen and the communists and with Soviet advisors moving in. Drawing in part upon materials supplied by French agents and Comintern records, this chapter explains how Ho Chi Minh bonded with a core group of confidants and comrades in Guangzhou, including youth trainees, many of whom would return to center stage in communist party organization in Hong Kong as well as in future actions. However, he was obliged to move this group away from anarchist and other ideologies in the interest of setting down a secretive Leninist-style cell system. Besides teaching and writing, Ho Chi Minh devoted much time to propagandizing among Vietnamese youth. The chapter also identifies the role of one Vietnamese double agent in brokering his local marriage, shortlived as it was, owing to the collapse of the united front and major repression of the Left.