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The internal aspect of learning is something that the existing literature has not investigated in detail. A range of examples are investigated in this chapter, with the first section addressing Belarusian and Russian learning from the Soviet Union. Then the chapter analyses how Putin learnt from his image failure after the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the early 2000s. The Kursk sinking led to a significant change in image with Putin becoming a macho-man. The 2009 Moldovan Twitter Revolution led to learning after the protest on the part of the nominally pro-European government and the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan provided learning opportunities for Ukrainian governments. The chapter then addresses sub-optimal legislation in Belarus and Russia and potential learning from the failure. Learning from failure has not been investigated too much in the existing literature and this chapter addresses the issue.
This chapter covers the Soviet-German war after the December 1941 Battle of Moscow and the failure of the initial Blitzkrieg; the Red Army takes the initiative after the Battle of Stalingrad and drives the Wehrmacht back to the western borderlands of the USSR by the spring of 1944. The Soviet winter offensive in 1941-2. Stalin’s over-optimism leads to setbacks at Kharkov and in Crimea. Hitler’s spring 1942 ‘second offensive’, Operation BLUE, concentrated in southern Russia. The Battle of Stalingrad; reasons for the success of Russian counter-attack. The responsibility of Hitler and his generals. Improvements in the Red Army are critically important. Spring 1943 and Hitler’s delayed attempt at a limited offensive in Operation CITADEL. The Battle of Kursk is followed by a successful Red Army counter-offensive across Ukraine in 1943-4. Developing diplomatic relations between Russia, Britain, and America. The Communist International disbanded. The first meeting of the ‘Big Three’ leaders at Tehran in late 1943: agreements about Polish borders and the timing of the British and American cross-Channel landing.
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