Adam Smith saw the division of labour and specialisation as the driver of ‘universal opulence’, a process limited by the scope of the market. He also believed that competition was essential to ensure growth benefited the public. Yet eventually there could be a trade-off between these two mechanisms. In today’s era of global production networks, the markets at certain links in supply chains may support just one specialised supplier; and in winner-take-all digital markets there is a single supplier even at global scale. When the scope of the market is global, there may be a trade-off between specialisation and competition.

This paper investigates the benefits of incorporating diversification effects into the pricing process of insurance policies from two different business lines. The paper shows that, for the same risk reduction, insurers pricing policies jointly can have a competitive advantage over those pricing them separately. However, the choice of competitiveness constrains the underwriting flexibility of joint pricers. The paper goes a step further by modelling explicitly the relationship between premiums and the number of customers in each line. Using the total collected premiums as a criterion to compare the competing strategies, the paper provides conditions for the optimal pricing decision based on policyholders’ sensitivity to price discounts. The results are illustrated for a portfolio of annuities and assurances. Further, using non-life data from the Brazilian insurance market, an empirical exploration shows that most pairs satisfy the condition for being priced jointly, even when pairwise correlations are high.

This article examines the impact of organizational structure on risk taking across different lines of property insurance (fire, marine, vehicle and specialized property insurance) in Sweden from 1913 to 1939. Based on the theoretical arguments whereby the mutual organizational form has a competitive advantage in underwriting homogeneous but unknown risk distribution, while the stock organizational form is more likely to underwrite more volatile and heterogeneous risk categories, we conclude that organizational form has a significant impact on risk taking. Our empirical analysis shows that the risk taking, measured as incurred claims to anticipated losses, was on average lower among mutual insurers. When comparing across lines of insurance, the analysis shows that the mutual form was more successful in keeping down risks in fire and marine, while less so in vehicle and specialized property insurance. Stock companies mitigated the higher risk by ceding more premiums to reinsurers and by diversifying more across different lines of insurance.