We examine the impact of balanced-budget labor income taxes on the existence of expectation-driven business cycles in a two-sector version of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (SGU) [(1997) Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000] model with constant government expenditures and counter-cyclical taxes. Our results show that the destabilizing impact of labor income taxes strongly depends on the capital intensity difference across sectors. Local indeterminacy is indeed more likely when the consumption good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate decreases, and less likely when the investment good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate increases. The implication of this result can be quantitatively significant. Indeed, when compared to SGU, local indeterminacy can be either completely ruled out for all OECD countries when the investment good is sufficiently capital intensive or drastically improved, delivering indeterminacy for a larger set of OECD countries, if the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive. Focusing however on recent estimates of the sectoral capital shares corresponding to the empirically plausible case of a capital intensive consumption good, we find that there is a significant increase of the range of economically relevant labor tax rates (from a minimum tax rate of 30% to 24.7% for which local indeterminacy arises with respect to the aggregate formulation of SGU.

We investigate the role of nonseparable preferences in the occurrence of macroeconomic instability under a balanced-budget rule where government spending is financed by a tax on labor income. Considering a one-sector neoclassical growth model with a large class of nonseparable utility functions, we find that expectations-driven fluctuations occur easily when consumption and labor are Edgeworth substitutes or weak Edgeworth complements. Under these assumptions, an intermediate range of tax rates and a sufficiently low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption lead to instability.